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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on various topics in Financial Economics.
Underwriter analysts issue recommendations that are on average more favorable than
recommendations of other analysts. In Chapter 1, I investigate whether this bias matters for
returns, and whether it matters for wealth redistribution between institutional and individ-
ual investors. I find that underwriter 'Strong Buy' recommendations for IPOs exhibit inferior
performance. For other positive recommendations - 'Buys' for IPOs, and 'Strong Buys' and
'Buys' for SEOs - there are no significant differences between affiliated and unaffiliated an-
alysts. Institutional reaction to analyst recommendations is broadly consistent with these
results. For IPOs, institutions increase their holdings only in response to unaffiliated recom-
mendations. For SEOs, the response to underwriter recommendations is actually somewhat
stronger than to non-underwriter recommendations. In addition, there is little evidence that
individual investors as a class incur losses by following the 'Strong Buy' recommendations
issued by IPO underwriters. Further analysis indicates that conflicts of interest is an unlikely
explanation for the favorable bias in underwriter analyst recommendations.
Chapter 2 is joint work with professor Jiang Wang. In this essay, we develop a method-
ology to identify money managers who have private information about future asset returns.
The methodology does not rely on a specific risk model, such as the Sharpe ratio, CAPM, or
APT. Instead, it relies on the observation that returns generated by managers with private
information cannot be replicated by those without it. Using managers' trading records, we
develop distribution-free tests that can identify such managers. We show that our approach
is general with regard to the nature of private information the managers may have, and with
regard to the trading strategies they may follow.
In Chapter 3, I study welfare implications of increased market transparency in a con-
text of a three-period model with risk-averse investors and constrained risk-neutral market
makers. Market makers' constraint can take one of two forms: they are either required to
have non-negative final wealth, or they cannot borrow. In addition to fundamental uncer-
tainty about a risky payoff, there is uncertainty about total market-making capacity in the
economy. Increased transparency is associated with reduction in this uncertainty. The more
transparent equilibrium improves the sharing of fundamental risk, and is Pareto optimal for
most parameter values. I also find that market makers' equilibrium positions are socially
optimal; a small exogenous change in their positions does not lead to Pareto improvement.
Thesis Supervisor: Jiang Wang
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Bias in Underwriter Analyst
Recommendations: Does it Matter?
1.1 Introduction
Analysts employed by underwriters issue recommendations that are on average more favor-
able than recommendations of other analysts. This empirical 'fact' elicits two questions.
First, does this bias have any economic significance? And second, what is the cause of
the bias? This paper is primarily concerned with the first question. In particular, I exam-
ine whether the bias in the level of underwriter recommendations matters for returns, and
whether it matters for wealth redistribution between institutional and individual investors.
I will come back to the second question in the concluding discussion.
The analysis in the paper is closely related to the recent investigations into analysts'
alleged conflicts of interest. Having witnessed a steady stream of revelations about analysts'
misbehavior, it is hard not to conclude that analysts are 'guilty'. However, after carefully
considering the underlying issues, this conclusion does not seem so obvious. For example,
if enough market participants are aware of the conflicts of interest faced by underwriter
analysts, it is not clear why their recommendations would have any price impact.
The allegations against investment banks can be reduced to two statements. One, un-
derwriter analysts had issued intentionally misleading recommendations, and two, investors,
and individual investors in particular, lost money by acting on these recommendations. For
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investors to lose money by following analyst recommendations, it must be true that these
recommendations have inferior performance, and that investors adjust their positions in re-
sponse to the recommendations. This reasoning naturally leads to the two questions I address
in the paper: 1) How does the performance of underwriter analyst recommendations compare
with those of other analysts? 2) How do institutions change their holdings of stocks recom-
mended by the analysts? The answer to the second question provides evidence on whether
individual investors, in aggregate, lose money by following analyst recommendations. It also
sheds light on the sophistication level of institutional investors.
The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. To answer the first question, I compare
the post-recommendation performance of 'Buy' and 'Strong Buy' recommendations issued
by analysts employed by the lead underwriter of an IPO/SEO with recommendations made
by other analysts. 1 I find that Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations for recent IPOs signifi-
cantly underperform the corresponding Non-Lead recommendations. In contrast, Lead 'Buy'
recommendations for IPOs perform as well as or better than the corresponding Non-Lead
recommendations. When the two recommendation categories are aggregated - as has been
done in prior work (Michaely and Womack (1999) and Dunbar, Hwang and Shastri (1999))
- there is no significant difference in performance of Lead and Non-Lead recommendations.
For SEOs, there are no significant differences in performance for either 'Buy' or 'Strong Buy'
recommendations.
The second stage of the analysis focuses on institutional response to analyst recommen-
dations. I consider two main questions: Do institutions react to analyst recommendations
in a way that is consistent with the results of the post-recommendation return analysis? Do
institutions improve their performance when they respond to analyst recommendations?
I find that for IPOs, institutions increase their holdings only in response to positive
recommendations by Non-Lead analysts. Positive Lead recommendations do not result in
significant changes in institutional holdings in either direction. For SEOs, reaction to pos-
itive recommendations is concentrated in smaller firms, and is somewhat stronger for Lead
'I refer to recommendations made by an analyst working for the lead underwriter as Lead, affiliated, or
underwriter. I refer to recommendations by all other analysts as Non-Lead or unaffiliated. Also, I collectively
refer to 'Strong Buy' and 'Buy' recommendations as positive or favorable, and to all other recommendations
as negative or unfavorable.
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recommendations. For both IPOs and SEOs, the reaction to 'Hold/Sell' recommendations
is always significantly negative. Not surprisingly, the 'Hold/Sell' recommendations by Lead
analysts are perceived as more negative. Finally, there is no evidence that institutions ei-
ther help or hurt their performance significantly when they adjust their holdings of stocks
recommended by the analysts.
The large difference in institutional response to 'Strong Buy' recommendations issued by
Lead and Non-Lead analysts for recent IPOs has two implications. First, institutions seem
to recognize that, for IPOs, the positive bias in underwriter recommendations does matter.
Second, their response to these recommendations appears to be incomplete. Given the
significant underperformance of Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations found in the first-stage
analysis, we would expect 'smart money' to be net sellers following these recommendations.
Instead, institutions maintain their holdings at the pre-recommendation level. Since the
aggregate position of individual investors does not change either, this category of investors
as a whole does not lose money by following analyst recommendations. Of course, this does
not preclude the possibility that some institutions or individuals lose money by following
analyst advice.
The existing empirical evidence on the relative performance of affiliated and unaffiliated
recommendations is mixed.2 For IPOs, Michaely and Womack (1999; hereafter, MW) find
that underwriter recommendations significantly underperform non-underwriter recommen-
dations. In contrast, the analysis in Dunbar, Hwang and Shastri (1999; hereafter, DHS) indi-
cates that the differences between the two categories of recommendations are much smaller.
Moreover, when underwriter recommendations immediately following an IPO are excluded,
the remaining (non-initial) recommendations show slightly better performance than the non-
underwriter recommendations. These papers have small sample sizes, and the analysis in
both papers uses buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) without adjusting for correlation
among observations (see Fama (1998) for a related discussion). I enhance the analyses in
these papers by having a much larger sample, employing more robust statistical methodol-
ogy, and by considering 'Strong Buy' and 'Buy' recommendations separately - a distinction
2The literature review focuses on papers that are most closely related to my analysis. Ritter and Welch
(2002) provide an extensive survey of recent IPO literature with a focus on the U.S. For an international
perspective, see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001).
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that turns out to be important. My more significant contribution is to examine institutional
response to analyst recommendations.
For SEOs, Lin and McNichols (1998; hereafter, LM) find that underwriter and non-
underwriter recommendations have similar performance. I use a mostly non-overlapping
sample and a different testing procedure, but arrive at the same conclusion.3
In a recent study of institutional response to analyst recommendations, Chen and Cheng
(2002) find that institutions increase their holdings of firms with favorable recommendations,
and decrease holdings of firms with unfavorable recommendations. They consider institu-
tional holdings of all firms, and do not distinguish between underwriter and non-underwriter
recommendations. My analysis of institutional holdings, which focuses on a subset of firms
and recommendations, is complementary to theirs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data. Analysis
of post-recommendation returns is in Section 1.3, followed by the analysis of institutional
holdings in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, I summarize the empirical findings presented in the
paper, and discuss how they are related to the alternative explanations of the favorable bias
in underwriter analyst recommendations.
1.2 Data Description
The data used in this study comes from five separate datasets. Return and market capi-
talization data is taken from the CRSP stock files. Book value of equity is obtained from
the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database. Analyst recommendations data is provided by
I/B/E/S (a unit of Thomson Financial), and starts in October of 1993. Data on IPOs and
SEOs, including the names of lead manager(s) and other members of the syndicate, is from
the SDC New Issues database, and begins in 1980. I exclude ADRs, limited partnerships,
unit offerings, REITs, closed-end funds, and issues with proceeds of less than $5 million.
3Several other papers - Womack (1996), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001, 2002) and
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2001) - investigate the performance of analyst recommendations. Rather
than focusing on the distinction between affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations, the main question
addressed in these papers is whether an investor can profit by following analyst recommendations. The
latter paper also examines the informational content of these recommendations after controlling for publicly
available variables known to forecast stock returns.
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Institutional holdings data is from the CDA/Spectrum database of 13F filings provided by
Thomson Financial, and begins in 1981. I downloaded daily and monthly Fama-French fac-
tors from Ken French's website.4 The institutional holdings, recommendations, and issuance
data ends in December of 2000. The return data ends in December of 2001.
The analysis in Section 1.3 uses recommendations made within the first year after is-
suance; the analysis in Section 1.4 extends the horizon to 16 months. I assign an analyst
affiliation code to each recommendation based on the underwriting relationship with the firm
being recommended. If the analyst's employer has acted as a lead underwriter for the firm
within the last year (last 16 months), the recommendation would be assigned a 'Lead' code;
otherwise it would be assigned a 'Non-Lead' code. 5 The link between underwriter data in
the SDC dataset and broker data in the I/B/E/S dataset is obtained by matching the names
of investment banks in the two databases. This mapping is then refined by using Hoover's
Online (the website of Hoover's Inc.), the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, Lexus-Nexus
archive, and corporate websites. 6
The institutional holdings data contains quarterly stock holdings of institutional invest-
ment managers that exercise investment discretion over more than $100 million in securities.
The quarterly filings are mandated by Section 13(f) of the Securities and Exchange Act
passed in 1975. CDA/Spectrum, which is now part of Thomson Financial, was hired by the
SEC to process Form 13F filings.7
Each reporting institution is assigned a manager type by Spectrum. The five possible
types are Bank, Insurance Company, Mutual Fund, Investment Advisor, and University
Endowment and Pension Fund. The Investment Advisor category includes large brokerage
firms and private investment managers. Because type classification after 1997 is not reliable,
I use the 1997 classification for all quarterly report dates in 1998-2000.8 The institutions
4I would like to thank Ken French for making factor returns and other useful data available on his website.
5 Both MW and DHS focus on the Lead vs. Non-Lead comparison. To the extent that I find differences
between the two categories, these differences tend to get reduced when recommendations by other syndicate
members are grouped together with Lead recommendations.
6I am grateful to Adam Kolasinski and S.P. Kothari for making this mapping available.
7See Gompers and Metrick (2001) for a more detailed description of this data.
8The database integration between two data providers resulted in an incorrect mapping and caused many
institutions to be assigned the wrong type. I would like to thank Michael Boldin of Wharton Research Data
Services for a helpful discussion regarding this problem.
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entering the database after 1997 may still be misclassified, but the fraction of assets managed
by these institutions is small.
To use institutional holdings data in my analysis, I aggregate manager-level observations
to the manager-type level. First, for each stock-manager-quarter observation, I compute
the fraction of total float held by the manager and drop observations where this fraction
exceeds 50%. Next, I add holdings of all managers belonging to a particular type, and drop
observations where the total exceeds 100%. Finally, I add holdings across all types to obtain
the total fraction held by all institutions. Once again, observations where total holdings
exceed 100% are excluded from the analysis.
1.3 Performance of Analyst Recommendations
In this section, I examine the returns associated with Lead and Non-Lead analyst recom-
mendations. In Section 1.3.1, I present various summary statistics for the recommendation
sample used in the analysis, including characteristics of stocks being recommended and the
timing of recommendations relative to the issuance date. The analysis of recommendation
returns consists of three parts. For comparison with existing literature, I first examine
size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for up to 250 trading days after the
recommendation. Next, as a robustness check for BHAR results, I use a rolling-portfolio
approach to construct time series of daily returns and examine abnormal performance of
analyst recommendations relative to the three-factor benchmark. Finally, I consider quar-
terly returns of portfolios formed on the basis of analyst recommendations in the preceding
quarter. The choice of quarterly horizon for both portfolio formation and return measure-
ment period is motivated by two considerations. First, it facilitates the comparison with the
analysis of institutional holdings which are reported on a quarterly frequency. Second, the
average time between recommendations revisions in my sample is about 155 calendar days,
or between one and two quarters.
12
1.3.1 Sample Description
Tables 1 presents descriptive statistics for the issuance data. Panel A of Table 1 shows that
the sample has an almost identical number of IPOs and SEOs, and that over ninety percent
of the issuers get at least one analyst recommendation within the first year of issuance. The
amount raised in secondary offerings exceeds, by about 60-70 percent, the amount raised in
IPOs. Not surprisingly, SEO firms are also much bigger. Panel B shows abnormal returns
accruing to a passive strategy that invests in all IPOs or SEOs 30 days after issuance and
keeps them in the portfolio for a year. SEOs underperform the three-factor benchmark
to a greater extent then do IPOs. The intercepts for SEO regressions are all significantly
negative, both at monthly and quarterly return-measurement horizon. Equal-weighted IPO
portfolio also significantly underperforms the benchmark, while value-weighted portfolio does
not. These results are generally consistent with the findings in Brav, Geczy and Gompers
(2000), who look at the five-year performance of IPOs and SEOs issued between 1975 and
1992. Jegadeesh (2001) also finds that SEO underperformance is robust to a variety of
benchmarks. Panel C reports the number of new issues per year, starting in late October
of 1992. Interestingly, the peak issuance occurs in 1996, long before the market reached its
heights in March of 2000.
Table 2 describes the sample of analyst recommendations used in the return analysis.
Panel A shows the number of Lead and Non-Lead recommendations issued for IPOs and
SEOs. For both groups of analysts, the vast majority of recommendations is either 'Buy'
or 'Strong Buy'. However, compared to unaffiliated analysts, underwriter analysts are even
less likely to issue 'Hold/Sell' recommendations, and the difference is bigger for SEOs (14.5%
vs. 25.8%) than for IPOs (11.2% vs. 15.6%). Also, affiliated analysts issue 'Strong Buy'
recommendations more frequently than do unaffiliated analysts. Finally, they make more
recommendations for IPOs than for SEOs, while the opposite is true about unaffiliated
analysts. This is consistent with the idea that research coverage by Lead analyst is especially
important for IPO firms, which often do not have wide analyst following.
Panels B and C display the frequency of recommendations per issue by affiliated and
unaffiliated analysts. Most issues receive at most one Lead recommendation, and multiple
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Non-Lead recommendations. These statistics imply that any portfolio formation method-
ology that depends on the number of Lead and Non-Lead recommendations issued after
the portfolio formation period would result in biased conclusions.9 It is also notable that a
substantial number of recent issues - 1467 IPOs and 1976 SEOs - do not receive any recom-
mendation from the Lead analyst. Examining the performance of these stocks might shed
some light on the motivation behind analysts' silence. We will come back to this issue in the
concluding discussion.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of analyst recommendations in event time during the first
year after public offering. I split the year into 30-day periods, and compute the proportion of
recommendations in a given category (e.g. Lead 'Strong Buy') made during each period. The
results are shown for the first three periods (days 0-30, 31-60, 61-90), and for the remaining
periods combined. 10 Figures la and lb show the results for IPOs and SEOs, respectively. It
is clear that a disproportionate number of favorable recommendations is issued during the
first 90 days after the offering. For example, 67.5% of all Lead 'Strong Buy' and 38.4% of
all Non-Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations for IPOs are issued during that period. For
SEOs, the comparable statistics are 58.7% and 33.9%, respectively. In contrast, most of the
'Hold/Sell' recommendations are made later in the year.
In Table 3, I examine characteristics of stocks recommended by the analysts. These
include size and book-to-market ratio after issuance, size-adjusted return for the initial 25-
day period following the offering and, for IPOs, the fraction of firms with venture-capital
backing. Size adjustment is done as described in the next subsection. The statistics shown
in the table are mean (equal-weighted) and median (in parentheses), computed across all
recommendations in a given category.
The overall conclusion from the table is that there are few differences among the stocks
recommended by the two groups of analysts. 1 1 Stocks with affiliated recommendations tend
9In their Table 6, MW examine the performance of firms conditioning on the source of recommendations
during the first year after issuance. Applying a similar procedure to my sample would compare returns
of firms with a single recommendation to the returns of firms with multiple recommendations. Since the
number of recommendations is correlated with performance, the portfolios would essentially be formed on
the basis of future returns, resulting in biased inference.
"The majority of IPO recommendations in the 0-30 bin are actually made after the end of the quiet
period (day 25 after issuance). However, there are exceptions to the quiet-period rule (see related discussion
in Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003)), and some recommendations in my sample are issued earlier.
"Although not reported in the table, size-adjusted returns for the three intervals around the date of
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to be smaller, and the difference is more pronounced for SEO firms. The initial return of
IPOs with Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations is noticeably smaller than the comparable
return for Non-Lead recommendations, although it is still large and positive. The return
statistics make it hard to argue that underwriter analysts issue positive recommendations to
provide 'booster shots' to their clients.
1.3.2 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns
For comparison with prior studies, I begin the analysis of affiliated and unaffiliated recom-
mendations by looking at the size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns at the time of,
and up to one year after, the recommendation announcement. The analysis in this and
the next subsections is confined to non-reiteration 'Strong Buy' and 'Buy' recommendations
made during the first year after the public offering. For a recommendation on stock s, the
abnormal return for the holding period starting on day a and ending on day b is computed
as
b b
ARS = ]7J(I+ rs,t) - ](i+ Td cl 6e,t)
t=a t=a
where r, t and rdecuie, are the returns of stock s and its matching CRSP size decile on day
t. The event-period return is computed for the three days surrounding the recommendation
date (day 0) by setting a = -1, b = 1. For the post-recommendation return computation,
a = 2 and b is either 250, or min(250, Effective stop date). MW use the first definition of b,
while DHS use the second one. I define the effective stop date for a recommendation as the
earliest date on which that recommendation is either withdrawn, or changed to a non-buy.
Once an abnormal event and post-event return for each recommendation is obtained, I
calculate equal- and value-weighted average BHARs and the corresponding standard errors.
Value-weighted averages use firm size at the time of issuance. Note that standard errors
in this subsection are computed assuming independence of observations, and are likely to
be understated. Panels A and B of Table 4 report these statistics for IPOs and SEOs,
recommendation (days -10 to -2, -1 to +1, and +2 to +10, where recommendation date is day 0) are similar
as well. The only exception is more negative event return for Lead 'Hold/Sell' recommendations.
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respectively. Results are shown for all recommendations, as well as for Lead and Non-Lead
recommendations separately.
For IPOs, the announcement-period returns are significantly positive, and are similar
for Lead and Non-Lead recommendations. Post-recommendation returns are significantly
negative. Lead recommendations underperform Non-Lead recommendations. The difference
of -4.5% in equal-weighted one-year returns is comparable to the -5.6% figure reported in
DHS (Table 2), and is substantially smaller in magnitude than the difference of -16.7%
reported in MW (Table 5).
For SEOs, the event-period returns are positive, and significant only for equal-weighted
returns. Long-term returns are significantly negative, and the underperformance appears to
be more severe for larger SEO firms.
It is important to point out that the results presented in this section should be interpreted
with caution. First, subtracting the matching size decile return is a crude way of adjusting
for risk. The most obvious shortcoming of this method is that it ignores variation in returns
associated with the book-to-market (B/M) factor. Second, the statistics in Table 4 are com-
puted ignoring the correlation among observations, which is a particularly serious problem
for long-horizon returns. The regression framework utilized in the next section addresses
both of these concerns.
1.3.3 Daily returns
In this section, I use a rolling-portfolio approach to check the robustness of the results
reported in the previous section. For a recommendation on stock s announced on date t, s
will be included in the event portfolio for dates t -- 1 to t + 1. It will be included in the post-
event portfolio for all dates between t + 2 and t + 250 (min(t + 250, Effective stop date) for
DHS-style long-term returns). I construct a time-series of equal- and value-weighted returns
for each of these portfolios. Value-weighted returns use market size (price times number of
shares outstanding) at the end of the previous trading date. Daily portfolio returns are then
regressed on daily Fama-French factors to obtain abnormal returns. Daily observations are
weighted by the number of firms in the portfolio on that day.
The intercepts from daily return regressions (in percent per day) are reported in Table
16
5: Repeating the format of Table 4, results are shown for all positive recommendations, as
well as for Lead and Non-Lead recommendations separately.
The most important conclusion from Table 5 is that there are no significant differences
between Lead and Non-Lead recommendations. Equal-weighted event returns are slightly
lower for the Lead, while value-weighted event returns are the same as or slightly higher than
for the Non-Lead. Post-event abnormal returns are also very close; value-weighted returns
for the Lead recommendations are in fact fractionally higher.
Several other results are notable as well. First, event-period abnormal returns are signif-
icantly positive, and are larger for IPOs than for SEOs. For SEOs, the change in magnitude
and significance of value-weighted event returns between Tables 4 and 5 is explained by the
significantly negative loadings of these firms on the HML factor. This difference highlights
the importance of controlling for both size and B/M when computing abnormal returns.
Second, post-event abnormal returns are insignificantly negative for equal-weighted IPOs,
close to zero for value-weighted IPOs, and are significantly negative for SEOs. These results
closely track the abnormal returns of the passive IPO/SEO benchmarks reported in Table 1.
Thus, stocks with positive analyst recommendations have a significantly positive event re-
turn, and post-event performance that is similar to other IPOs/SEOs.
The one-year return measurement horizon used so far is a somewhat arbitrary choice,
and may obscure the differences in post-recommendation performance between affiliated
and unaffiliated recommendations. In addition, for consistency with existing literature, I
have only been using non-reiteration 'Buy' and 'Strong Buy' recommendations grouped
together. In the next section, I apply the rolling-portfolio technique to quarterly returns.
All recommendations made during the first year after an IPO/SEO are included in the
analysis, and the performance of 'Strong Buy', 'Buy', and 'Hold/Sell' recommendations is
considered separately.
1.3.4 Quarterly returns
In this section I examine quarterly returns of portfolios formed on the basis of analyst
recommendations in the previous quarter. For quarter q + 1, the 'Any analyst' portfolio
contains all stocks with at least one recommendation in a given category (e.g. 'Strong Buy')
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during quarter q. In addition, each stock in that portfolio is allocated to exactly one of three
non-overlapping portfolios. Stocks with both affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations go
into the 'Lead and Non-Lead' portfolio. Stocks recommended only by affiliated analysts are
assigned to the 'Lead only' portfolio. Stocks recommended only by unaffiliated analysts are
assigned to the 'Non-Lead only' portfolio. Equal- and value-weighted returns for quarter
q + 1 are computed for each of these four portfolios. In addition, I compute the difference in
returns of 'Lead only' and 'Non-Lead only' portfolio. The abnormal return of this arbitrage
portfolio is the primary object of interest in the analysis. The whole procedure is repeated for
each quarter, resulting in time series of quarterly returns for each recommendation category.
Next, I regress these quarterly returns on quarterly Fama-French factors (computed from
monthly factor returns) to obtain quarterly abnormal returns. Quarterly observations for
each portfolio are weighted by the number of stocks in that portfolio for that quarter. The
intercepts from these regressions for the five portfolios described above are reported in Table
6. For convenience, I also include the returns on a passive benchmark that were shown in
Table 1.
Panel A shows the results for IPOs. The most striking conclusion is that Lead 'Buy'
and 'Strong Buy' recommendations perform very differently, relative to both the three-
factor benchmark and the corresponding Non-Lead recommendations. 'Strong Buy' rec-
ommendations exhibit underperformance that is economically and statistically significant.
Value-weighted returns following 'Buy' recommendations are economically large, but not
statistically significant. In addition, the performance of Lead 'Hold/Sell' recommendations
is more negative. All of these results hold if I exclude the last two years of recommenda-
tions (i.e. recommendations made in 1999 and 2000), or if I only consider non-reiteration
recommendations, as in the previous two sections. 1 2
The significant underperformance of Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations implies that
the favorable bias matters for this category of underwriter recommendations. However, it
does not tell us much about the probable cause of this bias. We will return to this discussion
in the concluding remarks.
12 Notice that because quarterly observations are weighted by the number of stocks in a portfolio, the
intercept on the Difference portfolio is not equal to the difference of the intercepts on the Lead and Non-
Lead portfolios.
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The results for SEOs, shown in panel B, indicate that there are no significant differ-
ences between affiliated and unaffiliated 'Strong Buy' recommendations. Lead 'Buy' and
'Hold/Sell' recommendations perform better than the corresponding Non-Lead recommen-
dations, but the differences are not statistically significant.
The difference in the relative performance of 'Strong Buy' recommendations for IPOs
and for SEOs is all the more notable when one considers that the patterns of summary
statistics presented in Panel A of Table 2 and in Figure 1 are similar for the two categories
of issuers. In both cases, affiliated analysts are less likely to issue negative recommendations,
and a larger fraction of their favorable recommendations is clustered in the 90-day period
immediately following the public offering. The analysis of post-recommendation returns for
SEOs demonstrates that the bias in the level of recommendations does not necessarily have
an economic impact.
In unreported tests, when I aggregate 'Strong Buy' and 'Buy' recommendations, I find
no significant differences in performance for either IPOs or SEOs. This finding is consistent
with the results in the previous section and underscores the importance of considering these
two recommendation categories separately. Also confirming the results in Section 1.3.3, the
performance of a portfolio that includes all stocks with positive analyst recommendations is
similar to the passive benchmark.
One of the disadvantages of the rolling-portfolio technique used in this section is that
factor loadings are assumed to be constant, even though the true loadings are time-varying.
Furthermore, many IPOs tend to be small, low B/M firms, and the three-factor model has
particularly hard time estimating returns for such firms. This raises the possibility that
the apparent underperformance of Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations is an illusion caused
by bad-model problems. However, I believe this explanation to be unlikely. First, factor
loadings on the 'Lead only' and 'Non-Lead only' portfolios are comparable. This suggests
that any shortcomings of the Fama-French model in describing expected returns should
affect the two portfolios in a similar fashion. Second, as we will see in Section 1.4.2, a
technique that allows for time-variation in factor loadings produces the same result. Finally,
the underperformance is significantly negative for both equal- and value-weighted returns,
and in fact becomes worse when I use value-weighted returns.
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Furthermore, besides being present in the subsample that ends in 1998, the inferior perfor-
mance of affiliated 'Strong Buy' recommendations for IPOs survives several other robustness
checks. The results in Figure 1, coupled with the evidence documented in DHS, suggest that
it may be caused by the recommendations made during the first 90 days following the offer-
ing. 13 However, the underperformance persists when these recommendations are excluded
from the analysis. It also shows up when abnormal returns are measured using the CAPM
and the 4-factor model that includes the momentum factor. Finally, when I measure returns
over a six-month period instead of a quarter, the relative performance of Lead 'Strong Buy'
recommendations remains negative, but is no longer statistically significant.
1.3.5 Summary
At this point it would be helpful to summarize what we have learned about the relative
performance of affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations. First, the announcement-period
returns are very similar for positive recommendations made by the two groups of analysts.
The event returns for Lead 'Hold/Sell' recommendations are more negative. Second, post-
event returns for recommendations on SEO firms are also similar. Third, affiliated 'Strong
Buy' recommendations on IPO firms significantly underperform both the three-factor bench-
mark, and the corresponding unaffiliated recommendations. This finding is robust to several
variations in the methodology. In contrast, affiliated 'Buy' and 'Hold/Sell' recommendations
tend to perform better than the corresponding Non-Lead recommendations, but the differ-
ences are not statistically significant. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the
favorable bias in underwriter recommendations matters only for IPO 'Strong Buy' recom-
mendations.
1.4 Institutional Holdings
The analysis in this section focuses on institutional response to analyst recommendations of
recent IPOs and SEOs. I consider two main questions: Do institutions react to analyst rec-
"Specifically, one of the findings in DHS is that there is a large positive difference in returns between
underwriter non-initial and initial favorable recommendations.
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ommendatiois in a way that is consistent with the results of the post-recommendation return
analysis? Do institutions enhance their performance when they trade stocks recommended
by the analysts?
The answer to the first question is informative about the level of sophistication of institu-
tional investors. Anecdotal evidence (see, for example, Boni and Womack (2002)) suggests
that these investors are aware of the potential conflicts of interest in underwriter analyst
recommendations. The analysis in Section 1.3.4, however, reveals that the story is not so
simple: analyst affiliation matters for the performance of recommendations on IPOs, but
not on SEOs. It is interesting to test whether institutions are aware of this distinction. In
addition, the answer to the first question sheds light on whether individual investors, in
aggregate, lose money by following affiliated analyst recommendations. The second question
complements the first one by providing more insight into the interaction between analyst
and institutional actions.
We begin the analysis by looking at the fraction of institutional holdings invested in
recent IPOs and SEOs, and at the performance of institutional portfolio invested in these
stocks. In this section, all IPOs and SEOs issued within 16 months of the quarter-end date
being considered are included in the analysis.
Panels A and B of Table 7 show the fraction of institutional portfolio invested in IPOs
and SEOs at year-end, broken down by manager type. To conserve space, I skip every other
year. Because of their size, IPOs make up a small fraction of total institutional holdings.
For the aggregate holdings, it ranges from 0.31 percent in 1982 to 2.31 percent in 1999. The
fraction of institutional portfolio invested in SEOs is substantially larger, ranging from 2.59
percent in 1988 to 18.41 percent in 1983. Consistent with the effect of prudent-man rules
documented in Del Guercio (1996), the investment in recent IPOs and SEOs is smallest for
banks and is largest for mutual funds and investment advisors. We will see later that these
two manager types also respond the most to analyst recommendations.
Table 8 shows the performance of institutional portfolio invested in recent IPOs and
SEOs relative to the three-factor benchmark. The results are presented for the time period
that matches the availability of analyst recommendations." The performance of IPO port-
"The main conclusions from this table hold when I consider the full sample of institutional holdings
21
folio is positive, and significant at the 10% level for mutual funds and investment advisors.
The abnormal returns for SEOs are negative, but significant only for banks and insurance
companies. Again, mutual funds and investment advisors have the best performance. When
institutional holdings are aggregated, the performance for IPOs is positive and marginally
significant at the 10% level, while the performance for SEOs is negative and insignificant. For
both IPOs and SEOs, the aggregate institutional portfolio outperforms the passive bench-
mark. Thus, institutions seem to exhibit stock-picking ability when choosing among recent
IPOs and SEOs.
1.4.1 Institutional response to analyst recommendations
To assess how institutions react to analyst recommendations, I run quarterly cross-sectional
regressions of changes in institutional holdings on recommendation and control variables.
Statistical inference is based on the time series of coefficients obtained from quarterly regres-
sions. The analysis in this and the next sections uses all recommendations made by analysts
during the first 16 months after issuance. All recommendations below 'Buy' are aggregated
into 'Hold/Sell' category, because recommendations below 'Hold' make up less than three
percent of all recommendations.
For quarter t, I run the following regression across all stocks s held by institutions:
A%s,t- at + Bt - Recomm,, t + Ct - Controls, t + Es, t .
The dependent variable, change in institutional holdings of stock s during quarter t (A%S ,
is computed for all institutions, as well as for the two subsets of institutions described below.
In all cases, institutional holdings of s must be available both for quarter t - 1 and quarter
t; otherwise stock s is not used in the regression for quarter t.
Recommendation variables reflect the number of 'Strong Buy', 'Buy', and 'Hold/Sell'
recommendations made by analysts during quarter t. I use the logarithm of one plus the
number of recommendations in a given category as the actual variable. For example, suppose
that there are two unaffiliated 'Buy' recommendations on stock s during quarter t. Then
covering 1981-2000.
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the unaffiliated Buy variable for stock s in the cross-sectional regression for quarter t would
equal to log(1 + 2) = log(3). 15
Control variables proxy for changes in characteristics of stock s that might affect its
attractiveness to institutional investors. The following control variables have been motivated
by the discussion in Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Falkenstein (1996):
* 15: An indicator variable set to 1 if the stock price is below $5 at the beginning of
quarter t - 1, and is above $5 at the end of quarter t - 1; set to -1 if the opposite is
true; and set to 0 otherwise
* 1o: Similar to 15, but for the $10 level
* R,, t-1: Raw return during the previous quarter
* Change in log of volatility of daily return between quarter t - 1 and t - 2
* Change in log of average daily turnover between quarter t - 1 and t - 2
* Change in log of shares outstanding between end of quarter t - 1 and t - 2
These variables control for changes in liquidity, volatility, firm size, momentum, and insti-
tutional frictions. Minor changes to the definitions of the last three control variables do not
affect the results.
For each set of dependent and independent variables, I run two sets of quarterly regres-
sions. For equal-weighted position changes, quarterly observations are unweighted, giving
each stock the same weight. For value-weighted position changes, the observation for each
stock is weighted by the market size of that stock at the end of quarter t - 1. This makes
larger stocks more important in determining regression coefficients.
The original analysis in this and the next sections has been done at the manager type
level. Based on the results of that analysis, and taking into account the descriptive statistics
I use the log transformation because the incremental effect of additional recommendations is likely to be
non-linear. It is rare for a number of affiliated recommendations for any stock-quarter to exceed one, while
for unaffiliated recommendations it is very common. Using this transformation allows for a more meaningful
comparison between coefficients on Lead and Non-Lead recommendations. All of the main findings in this
and the next section remain intact if I instead use the actual number of recommendations, or the indicator
variables for 'one or more' and 'two or more' recommendations.
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in Tables 7 and 8, I combine manager types into two categories. The conservative group
consists of Banks, Insurance Companies, and University Endowments and Pension Funds
(abbreviated B/IC/PF). The aggressive group consists of Mutual Funds and Investment
Advisors (abbreviated MF/IA). Compared to the institutions in the former category, the
ones in the latter category allocate a greater fraction of their portfolios to recent issuers, have
better performance when investing in these stocks, and show a more significant response to
analyst recommendations.
The results for the two groups of institutions, and for the aggregate institutional hold-
ings, are in Table 9. To conserve space, I only show the coefficients on recommendation
variables, and discuss the coefficients on control variables below. Panels A and B show the
results for IPOs and SEOs, respectively, when all recommendations are pooled together.
For IPOs, institutions respond both to positive and negative recommendations. The results
are similar for equal- and value-weighted position changes, probably because even the rela-
tively larger IPOs tend to be small firms. For SEOs, the equal- and value-weighted results
are very different. Institutions respond to positive recommendations only on smaller firms;
when position changes are value-weighted, there is no significant response to either 'Strong
Buy' or 'Buy' recommendations. 1 6 The reaction to 'Hold/Sell' recommendations is always
significantly negative.
The next two panels show value- and equal-weighted coefficients for IPOs when affiliated
and unaffiliated recommendations are included in the regression separately. The difference
in institutional reaction to 'Strong Buy' recommendations by affiliated and unaffiliated an-
alysts is striking, especially for value-weighted results. The difference in response is more
pronounced for the conservative category. In fact, institutions in this group reduce their
holdings in response to Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations.
The relative differences in equal- and value-weighted position changes match the relative
differences in underperformance of equal- and value-weighted Lead 'Strong Buy' recom-
mendations. Recall from Table 6 that the underperformance is worse for value-weighted
recommendations. Fittingly, the difference between affiliated and unaffiliated 'Strong Buy'
161t is important to remember that in the context of this paper, 'no response' does not imply that institu-
tions do not trade. Rather, it indicates that their net trade is close to zero, so that their aggregate position
does not change appreciably.
24
coefficients for value-weighted results is much larger (3.54) than for equal-weighted results
(1.44). In addition, the aggregate Lead 'Strong Buy' coefficient in value-weighted regressions
is negative, while the corresponding coefficient in equal-weighted regressions is positive.
The pattern of coefficients on 'Buy' recommendations is mixed. For value-weighted posi-
tion changes, the Lead coefficient exceeds the Non-Lead coefficient, although the difference
is small. For equal-weighted results, the Lead coefficient is close to zero, while the Non-
Lead coefficient is significantly positive. The difference is caused by the reaction of Mutual
Funds and Investment Advisors. Finally, the response to Lead 'Hold/Sell' recommendations
is significantly more negative.
The last two panels of Table 9 contain coefficients on affiliated and unaffiliated rec-
ommendations for SEOs. For value-weighted position changes, the response to positive
recommendations is muted, regardless of the source. For equal-weighted observations, the
response to 'Strong Buy' and 'Buy' recommendations by both Lead and Non-Lead is signif-
icantly positive. In fact, the reaction to Lead recommendations is stronger for all subsets
of institutions. For aggregate holdings, the difference in 'Strong Buy' coefficients (3.66 for
Lead vs. 1.30 for Non-Lead) is statistically significant at the 1% level, while the difference
in 'Buy' coefficients (1.24 vs. 0.29) is significant at the 10% level. Again, the response to
Lead 'Hold/Sell' recommendations is significantly more negative.
The (unreported) coefficients on control variables show several notable patterns. First,
the coefficient on previous-quarter return is significantly positive for both IPOs and SEOs,
suggesting that institutions are momentum investors.' 7 For SEOs, the coefficients on price
level variables are positive and significant, especially for the $10 level. This implies that
institutions are reluctant to hold low-priced stocks. Finally, the coefficient on change in
turnover is negative, and significant for SEOs only.
The results in this section confirm that the negative performance of affiliated 'Strong
Buy' recommendations is real, and institutional investors are aware of it.1 8 Furthermore,
"In unreported results, I include the momentum factor in the regressions that measure the performance
of institutional portfolio invested in IPOs and SEOs. Consistent with the results discussed here, I find that
for both IPOs and SEOs, all institutional portfolios have significantly positive loadings on the momentum
factor.
18Unless noted otherwise, all results described in the text hold when the dependent variable, change in
percent held by institutions, is censored at the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution.
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institutions distinguish between affiliated recommendations made for IPOs and for SEOs.
The reaction to the latter is significantly positive. Taken together, these findings indicate
that institutional investors are indeed sophisticated.
Finally, there is no compelling evidence that individual investors as a class lose money by
following affiliated 'Strong Buy' IPO recommendations. For aggregate institutional holdings,
the coefficient on Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendation flips sign between value- and equal-
weighted regressions (see Panels C and D). In both cases, it is not significantly different from
zero. The value-weighted coefficient becomes positive in the censored sample. This discus-
sion suggests that while institutional investors recognize the underperformance of affiliated
'Strong Buy' recommendations, their response to these recommendations is incomplete.
1.4.2 Subsequent stock performance
So far, we have looked separately at the stock performance following analyst recommenda-
tions, and at the institutional reaction to these recommendations. A natural extension of
those inquiries is to examine stock performance conditioning on both analyst and institu-
tional actions. For example, we have seen that institutions on average do not change their
holdings of IPO stocks following Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations. However, it might be
the case that institutional investors can distinguish between good and bad recommendations,
so that even though their holdings do not change on average, they still do well when trading
those stocks. Thus, this analysis addresses the question of whether institutions improve their
performance when they adjust their holdings of stocks recommended by the analysts. It also
serves as a robustness check for our earlier findings.
The methodology used in this section involves two steps. In the first step, for each stock
s held by institutions at the end of quarter t, I estimate abnormal return during quarter t+1I
by regressing daily returns of that stock on the Fama-French factors. I call this estimate
os, ti+.1 9 Notice that this procedure allows for time variation in factor loadings of individual
stocks across different quarters.
'
9 By focusing on abnormal return relative to the 3-factor benchmark, this methodology implicitly assumes
that analysts and institutional investors are not trying to predict factor returns, i.e. that they are stock-
pickers rather than market-timers.
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In the second step of the analysis, I run quarterly cross-sectional regressions where the
dependent variable is ^, ti, and the independent variables are analyst recommendations
and demeaned changes in institutional holdings (A%s, t) during quarter t, and the interaction
terms between these two sets of variables:
a'^s, t+1 = at + Bt - Recomm5 , t + dt - A%s, t + Ct - (Recomms, t x A%s,t) + Es,t.
The recommendation variables and changes in institutional holdings are defined as in Section
1.4.1. I run separate regressions for institutions in the conservative and aggressive categories,
and for all institutions combined.
Again, for each set of independent variables, I run two sets of quarterly regressions. For
equal-weighted abnormal returns, observations are unweighted, giving each stock the same
weight. For value-weighted abnormal returns, observation for each stock is weighted by the
market size of that stock at the end of quarter t.
Table 10 reports time-series averages of the coefficients obtained from the quarterly re-
gressions. Significance levels are based on the corresponding t-statistics. For brevity, I
only include the results for the value-weighted case. The first regression shown in the table
includes only institutional position changes, the second one includes position changes and
analyst recommendations separately, and the third one adds the interaction terms.
The results of the first regression for IPOs indicate that stocks bought by Mutual Funds
and Investment Advisors perform significantly better, consistent with the results in Table
8. In addition, the results from the second regression confirm the inferior performance of
affiliated 'Strong Buy' recommendations. In contrast, the affiliated 'Buy' recommendations
perform better than the unaffiliated 'Buys', but the difference is not as large as for the
'Strong Buy' recommendations. Both of these findings are consistent with value-weighted
results for IPOs reported in Table 6. Thus, the main findings in Section 1.3.4 are robust to
a different econometric methodology, and hold in a somewhat different sample.2 0
The coefficients on the interaction terms are mostly close to zero. The uniformly negative
20 There are several differences between recommendation samples used in Section 1.3 and in Section 1.4.
First, I include issuing firms and recommendations for a longer time period: 16 months instead of one year.
Second, I only look at stocks held by institutional investors. Third, data requirements for calculating position
changes ensure that IPO firms are excluded for at least one quarter after issuance.
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(and significant for MF/IA) coefficient on Lead 'Hold/Sell' recommendations suggests that
institutions overreact to these recommendations. This conjecture is supported by the positive
coefficients on Lead 'Hold/Sell' recommendations in the second regression, and by the strong
negative reaction to these recommendations documented in Table 9.
The results for SEOs are more muted. The coefficients on position change variable are
close to zero. Consistent with the earlier evidence, there are no significant differences in per-
formance of affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations. The coefficients on the interaction
terms are also statistically close to zero, except for the significantly positive coefficient on
Non-Lead 'Buy' recommendations for the aggressive group.
To summarize, the results in this section do not provide strong evidence that institutions
either help or hurt their performance when they trade stocks recommended by the analysts.
While institutional investors avoid the impact of inferior performance associated with Lead
'Strong Buy' recommendations for IPOs, they do not exploit it either. The analysis does
serve as a useful robustness check for the earlier findings.
1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has examined the relative performance of affiliated and unaffiliated analyst rec-
ommendations, and the institutional reaction to these recommendations. The analysis tells
us whether the positive bias in the level of underwriter analyst recommendations matters
for returns and for wealth redistribution between institutional and individual investors. It
is also related to recent allegations that individual investors have lost money by listening to
the analysts. The empirical findings of my analysis can be summarized as follows.
First, affiliated 'Strong Buy' recommendations for IPOs show inferior performance. This
result is robust to a variety of econometric methodologies, and holds in the 1993-1998 sub-
period. Institutional reaction to these recommendations suggests that the effect is real.
Second, there are no other significant differences in returns between affiliated and un-
affiliated recommendations, both during and after the announcement. Again, institutional
response is consistent with these results.
Third, institutional investors seem to be aware of the potential conflicts of interest in
28
affiliated recommendations. Moreover, they recognize that the actual performance of affili-
ated and unaffiliated recommendations for SEOs is similar. In addition, institutions display
stock-picking ability when investing in recent IPOs and SEOs. For both IPOs and SEOs,
institutional portfolio invested in these stocks outperforms a passive benchmark.
Last, institutional response to affiliated 'Strong Buy' recommendations for IPOs appears
to be incomplete. Instead of being active sellers, institutions keep their holdings at the pre-
recommendation level. This implies that individual investors as a class do not lose money
by following analyst advice.
The empirical evidence presented in the paper highlights two important points. First,
the positive bias in the level of recommendations is not sufficient to have an economic
impact. The results in Table 2 indicate that the bias in underwriter recommendations
for SEOs is somewhat stronger than for IPOs. Yet I find almost no differences in returns
and in institutional response to affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations. The inferior
performance of Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations for IPOs implies that the market as a
whole overvalues these stocks at the time they are recommended.
The second point is that the comparison of post-recommendation returns does not tell us
anything about the potential cause of the bias. As has been pointed out by several authors
(see, for example, LM and MW), the bias is consistent with two alternative hypotheses. Un-
der the conflicts-of-interest hypothesis, analysts intentionally issue positive recommendations
in an effort to please their investment-banking clients. Under the non-strategic bias hypoth-
esis, issuers choose underwriters who are relatively optimistic about their prospects. This
causes underwriter analyst recommendations to be more favorable than the recommendations
of other analysts. Examining the performance of affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations
does not allow us to distinguish between these hypotheses.
However, I believe there are several pieces of evidence that point to one of the two ex-
planations. The strongest evidence against the conflicts-of-interest explanation comes from
examining the performance of stocks that do not get any recommendations from the Lead
analyst. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 11. Panel A shows abnormal
returns of a portfolio that is formed similarly to the passive benchmark that was discussed
in Section 1.3.1. The portfolio includes all stocks that do not receive any Lead recommenda-
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tions during the first year after issuance. If underwriter analysts are strategic when deciding
which stocks to cover, this portfolio formation methodology would bias the returns down-
ward. Instead, we observe that the no-recommendation portfolio has better performance
than a passive strategy that invests in all recent issues. The no-recommendation portfolio in
panel B is re-formed at the end of every quarter, and includes all stocks without Lead rec-
ommendation during that quarter. This strategy outperforms a similar strategy that invests
in stocks receiving Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendations. These results are inconsistent with
the common allegation that analysts deliberately keep quiet about the stocks for which they
do not have anything good to say.
In addition, the results in Table 6 indicate that Lead 'Buy' recommendations of IPO
stocks have better performance than the corresponding 'Strong Buy' recommendations. This
pattern is also inconsistent with the conflicts-of-interest story. Underwriter analysts could
improve the performance of their 'Strong Buy' recommendations simply by moving 'Buy'-
rated firms to a 'Strong Buy', especially since such a change in rating could only enhance
their investment banking relationship with the recommended firm.
Finally, direct comparison shows that firms recommended only by Lead analysts are much
smaller than firms recommended only by Non-Lead analysts. In particular, for IPO 'Strong
Buy' recommendations, the average size of firms in the 'Lead only' portfolio described in
Section 1.3.4 is less than half the size of firms in the 'Non-Lead only' portfolio in 18 out
of the 29 quarters. If conflicts of interest cause underwriter analysts to issue favorable
recommendations, why would they risk their reputation on smaller firms, when the potential
investment banking business of larger firms is much more lucrative? Thus, given the empirical
evidence, I contend that the non-strategic over-optimism is a more likely explanation for the
positive bias in underwriter analyst recommendations.
As a final point, conflicts of interest other than those associated with investment bank-
ing relationships may affect analyst recommendations (Boni and Womack (2002)). In Lim
(2001), analysts trade off bias to improve management access and accuracy of earnings fore-
casts. His results suggest that optimal forecasts would be positively biased. As another
example, an analyst may be reluctant to downgrade a stock in which her best institutional
client holds a large position. This conflict of interest does not receive a lot of attention today,
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but it will surely gain in prominence if institutional investors are asked to pay for research
directly. It is worth considering possibilities like these when attempting the impossible task
of eliminating conflicts of interest in the securities industry.
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Table 1. SDC sample description
The issuance data starts in October of 1992. Panel A shows summary statistics for the IPO and SEO samples. I
exclude ADRs, limited partnerships, unit offerings, REITs, closed-end funds, and issues with proceeds of less
than $5 million. The second column gives the number of issuers with at least one analyst recommendation
during the first year after issuance.
Panel B reports intercepts from a regression of monthly and quarterly returns of a passive benchmark portfolio
on the Fama-French factors. The passive strategy invests in all IPOs (SEOs) 30 days after issuance, and keeps
these stocks in the portfolio for a year. Newey-West t-statistics are in [square brackets].
Panel C shows the number of IPOs / SEOs per year.
Panel A. Summary statistics
Number of issues Size after
Total with at least Issue Size ($MM) Issuance ($MM)
one Recom'n Mean Median Mean Median
IPOs 3,534 3,219 83.0 38.0 300.6 124.0
SEOs j 3,529 3,334 134.7 63.8 1,586.0 386.5
Panel B. Abnormal returns (3-factor model)
Skipping 30 days after offer date
Monthly Quarterly
EW VW EW VW
IPOs -0.70 0.08 -2.53 -0.82
[-1.58] [0.19] [-2.07] [-0.95]
SEOs -0.74 -0.56 -2.54 -2.63
[-4.31] [-2.69] [-5.36] [-3.14]











*Note: 1992 data starts in late October
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Table 2. Frequency of recommendations by analyst affiliation
The table shows the number and frequency of 'Strong Buy', 'Buy', and 'Hold/Sell' recommendations for IPOs
and SEOs during the first year after issuance, broken down by analyst affiliation. The recommendations data
is provided by I/B/E/S, and covers the period 10/29/1993 through 12/31/2000.
Panel A. Number of 'Strong Buy', 'Buy', and 'Hold/Sell' recommendations
Recommendation IPOs SEOs
Source Strong Buy Buy Hold / SellJ Strong Buy Buy Hold / Sell
Lead 1,181 1,154 295 875 850 293
(Percent) (44.9) (43.9) (11.2) (43.4) (42.1) (14.5)
Non-Lead 6,086 7,423 2,506 8,501 9,498 6,266
(Percent) (38.0) (46.4) (15.6) (35.0) (39.1) (25.8)
Panel B. Frequency of recommendations -- IPOs
Recommendation Number of recommendations per IPO
Source 0 1 2 3 4 5+
Lead 1,467 1,109 466 137 28 12
Non-Lead 170 344 467 457 393 1,388
Panel C. Frequency of recommendations -- SEOs
Recommendation Number of recommendations per SEO
Source 0 1 2 3 4 5+
Lead 1,976 904 310 105 24 15
Non-Lead 98 276 367 360 322 1,911
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Table 3. Characteristics of stocks recommended by the analysts
The table shows characteristics of stocks recommended by the analysts. The book-to-market ratio is the first
available after the offering. For IPOs, the fraction of firms with venture-capital backing is also reported. Size-
adjusted initial return is computed for the period of 25 calendar days after issuance. Mean (equal-weighted) and
median (in parentheses) are computed across all Lead / Non-Lead recommendations in a given category (e.g.
'Strong Buy') made during the first year after issuance.
Panel A. IPO Recommendations
Strong Buy Buy Hold / Sell
Stock Characteristic Lead Non-Lead Lead Non-Lead Lead Non-Lead
Size after issuance ($MM) 509.2 624.3 548.5 634.6 335.8 828.8
(Median) (159.9) (206.6) (186.4) (237.0) (150.3) (236.1)
Book Equity / Market Equity 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.46
(Median) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Initial return (in %) 29.4 54.0 53.8 61.7 46.8 51.5
(Median) (9.6) (20.3) (20.0) (25.2) (15.2) (21.0)
Fraction with VC backing (%) 42.0 48.1 45.7 53.6 44.2 49.4
Panel B. SEO Recommendations
Strong Buy Buy Hold I Sell
Stock Characteristic Lead Non-Lead Lead Non-Lead Lead Non-Lead
Size after issuance ($MM) 2,441.6 3,408.0 2,068.5 3,197.0 1,391.8 2,924.3
(Median) (447.5) (726.1) (467.7) (780.8) (356.8) (872.9)
Book Equity / Market Equity 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.41 0.49 0.47
(Median) (0.38) (0.34) (0.37) (0.33) (0.40) (0.39)
Initial return (in %) 6.5 6.8 5.3 6.4 3.0 5.9
(Median) (4.4) (4.0) (4.2) (4.0) (2.5)L (3.2)
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Table 4. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns
The table shows average size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns at the time of, and following analyst recommendations of recent
IPOs and SEOs. The sample of recommendations contains all non-reiteration 'Buy' and 'Strong Buy' recommendations during the first year
after issuance. For each recommendation, event return is computed for the three trading days centered on the date of recommendation
(day 0). '1-Year' post-event return is computed over days [+2, +250]. '1-Year or Rvrsl' post-event return is computed over days [+2,
min(250, Effective stop date)], where Effective stop date for a recommendation is defined as the earliest date on which that
recommendation is either withdrawn, or changed to a non-Buy. Value-weighted averages use firm market size at the time of issuance.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed assuming independence of observations.
Panel A. IPOs
Number Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
Recommendation of Event Post-Event Event Post-Event
Source Rec'ns 1-Year 1-Year or Rvrsl 1-Year 1-Year or Rvrsl
Any analyst 12,831 1.5 -7.4 -4.5 0.7 -4.3 -3.7
(s.e.) (0.1) (0.9) (0.8) (0.2) (1.3) (1.2)
Lead 1,945 1.2 -11.2 -7.7 0.6 -8.1 -5.4
(s.e.) (0.3) (2.0) (1.9) (0.4) (3.2) (3.1)
Non-Lead 10,886 1.5 -6.7 -3.9 0.7 -3.7 -3.4
(s.e.) (0.1) (1.0) (0.9) (0.2) (1.5) (1.3)
Panel B. SEOs
Number Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
Recommendation of Event Post-Event Event Post-Event
Source Rec'ns 1-Year 1-Year or Rvrsl 1-Year 1-Year or Rvrsl
Any analyst 16,112 0.8 -6.1 -2.6 0.1 -16.3 -11.7
(s.e.) (0.1) (0.7) (0.6) (0.1) (1.4) (1.2)
Lead 1,408 0.6 -8.1 -4.4 0.5 -12.4 -9.5
(s.e.) (0.2) (2.1) (1.9) (0.6) (5.0) (4.9)
Non-Lead 14,704 0.8 -5.9 -2.5 0.1 -16.6 -11.9
(s.e.) (0.1) (0.7) (0.6) (0.2) (1.5) (1.3)
Table 5. Intercepts from daily return regressions on Fama-French factors
The table shows the intercepts (in percent per day) obtained by regressing daily 'Event' and 'Post-Event' portfolio returns on
the Fama-French factors (contemporaneous and up to 4 lags). The sample of recommendations contains all non-reiteration
'Buy' and 'Strong Buy' recommendations during the first year after issuance. A stock with recommendation on date t will be
included in 'Event' portfolio on dates [t-1, t+1]. It will be included in the '1-Year Post-Event' portfolio on dates [t+2,t+250],
and in the '1-Year or Rvrsl Post-Event' portfolio on dates [t+2, min(t+250, Effective stop date)]. Effective stop date for a
recommendation is defined as the earliest date on which that recommendation is either withdrawn, or changed to a non-Buy.
Value-weighted returns use market size at the end of the previous trading day. Daily observations are weighted by the number
of firms in the portfolio on that day. Newey-West t-statistics are in [square brackets].
Panel A. IPOs
Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
Recommendation Event Portfolio Post-Event Portfolio Event Portfolio Post-Event Portfolio
Source 1-Year 1-Year or RvrsIl 1-Year 1-Year or Rvrsl
Any analyst 0.454 -0.018 -0.022 0.317 -0.013 -0.011
[t-stat] [10.35] [-1.05] [-1.30] [5.52] [-0.65] [-0.54]
Lead 0.375 -0.022 -0.028 0.312 -0.002 0.001
[t-stat] [3.87] [-1.11] [-1.38] [2.81] [-0.07] [0.03]
Non-Lead 0.486 -0.020 -0.023 0.325 -0.014 -0.011
[t-stat] [10.54] [-1.10] [-1.27] [5.44] [-0.68] [-0.54]
Panel B. SEOs
Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
Recommendation Event Portfolio Post-Event Portfolio Event Portfolio Post-Event Portfolio
Source 1-Year 1-Year or Rvrsl 1-Year 1-Year or Rvrs
Any analyst 0.243 -0.031 -0.027 0.154 -0.038 -0.037
[t-stat] [8.45] [-2.63] [-2.34] [4.19] [-3.65] [-3.47]
Lead 0.151 -0.034 -0.029 0.236 -0.035 -0.036
[t-stat] [1.87] [-2.59] [-2.26] [2.46] [-2.26] [-2.15]
Non-Lead 0.254 -0.031 -0.027 0.160 -0.040 -0.039
[t-stat] [8.55] [-2.59] [-2.32] [4.30] [-3.84] [-3.61]
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Table 6. Intercepts from quarterly return regressions on Fama-French factors
The table shows the intercepts obtained by regressing quarterly returns of portfolios formed on the basis of analyst
recommendations in the preceding quarter on the Fama-French factors. For return computation in quarter q+1 for a given
recommendation category (e.g. 'Strong Buy'), the 'Any analyst' portfolio includes all stocks with at least one recommendation in
that category in quarter q. Each stock in that portfolio is also allocated to exactly one of the three non-overlapping portfolios
('Lead and Non-Lead', 'Lead only', 'Non-Lead only'), depending on the affiliation of the analysts making recommendations on
that stock during quarter q. Quarterly observations for each portfolio are weighted by the number of stocks in that portfolio for
that quarter (that is the reason for the intercept on the Difference portfolio not being equal to the difference of the intercepts on
the Lead and Non-Lead portfolios). Newey-West t-statistics are in [square brackets]. For convenience, I also include the
returns on the passive benchmark that were shown in Table 1. See notes for Table 2 for the description of the recommendation
Panel A. IPOs (Q1 1994--Q1 2001)
Recommendation Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
Source Strong Buy Buy Hold/Sell Strong Buy Buy Hold/Sell
Any analyst -3.15 -2.45 -1.84 -0.58 0.13 1.09
[t-stat] [-1.95] [-1.75] [-1.45] [-0.57] [0.11] [0.69]
Lead and Non-Lead -4.26 -4.98 -0.45 -2.42 -0.07 -1.36
[t-stat] [-1.56] [-1.82] [-0.09] [-0.84] [-0.04] [-0.29]
Lead only -5.45 -1.08 -3.34 -4.98 2.58 -1.59
[t-stat] [-3.72] [-0.48] [-1.22] [-2.69] [0.85] [-0.63]
Non-Lead only -2.60 -2.15 -1.70 -0.04 -0.74 0.90
[t-stat] [-1.69] [-1.73] [-1.40] [-0.04] [-0.52] [0.55]
Diff. (Lead vs Non-Lead) -3.84 0.12 -3.12 -5.30 6.79 -4.57
[t-stat] [-4.13] [0.07] [-1.21] [-2.96] [1.50] [-1.361
Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
Passive IPO -2.53 -0.82
benchmark [-2.07] [-0.95]
Panel B. SEOs (Q1 1994 -- Q1 2001)
Recommendation Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
Source Strong Buy Buy Hold/Sell Strong Buy Buy Hold/Sell
Any analyst -2.31 -2.27 -3.04 -3.22 -2.81 -2.01
[t-stat] [-4.06] [-4.22] [-6.17] [-3.80] [-2.93] [-3.93]
Lead and Non-Lead -3.24 -0.18 -4.08 -3.51 -3.21 2.87
[t-stat] [-2.47] [-0.18] [-1.97] [-1.60] [-.14] [1.41]
Lead only -2.46 -0.88 -4.77 -4.17 -1.27 -6.04
[t-stat] [-3.42] [-0.75] [-1.69] [-2.39] [-0.57] [-2.08]
Non-Lead only -2.16 -2.54 -2.97 -2.96 -2.47 -2.06
[t-stat] [-3.37] [-4.36] [-5.23] [-2.83] [-3.05] [-3.89]
Diff. (Lead vs Non-Lead) 0.04 1.32 -0.59 -1.26 1.12 -2.85
[t-stat] [0.04] [1.16] [-0.13] [-0.49] [0.44] [-0.65]
Equal-Weighted Returns Value-Weighted Returns
Passive SEO -2.54 -2.63
benchmark [-5.36] 1 [-3.14]
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Table 7. Fraction of institutional holdings invested in recent iPOs and SEOs
I use institutional holdings reported at calendar year-end to compute the fraction of institutional portfolio
invested in recent IPOs and SEOs. Stocks that had a public offering within 16 months of the year-end
date are counted as recent IPOs (SEOs). UE & PF stands for University Endowments and Pension
Funds.
Panel A. Fraction of institutional holdings invested in recent IPOs (in percent)
Year-End Banks Insurance Mutual Investment UE & PF All
Companies Funds Advisors Institutions
1982 0.15 0.20 0.39 0.50 0.43 0.31
1984 0.36 0.37 0.87 0.87 0.32 0.57
1986 0.70 0.93 1.58 1.74 1.13 1.22
1988 0.27 0.29 0.48 0.64 0.30 0.44
1990 0.19 0.49 0.55 0.66 0.17 0.44
1992 0.86 1.14 2.29 2.34 0.70 1.67
1994 0.71 1.55 2.10 1.75 0.57 1.42
1996 1.19 2.08 2.57 2.40 1.27 2.09
1998 0.37 0.87 0.86 1.13 0.37 0.84
2000 0.89 0.90 1.56 1.67 1.85 1.45
Panel B. Fraction of institutional holdings invested in recent SEOs (in percent)
Year-End Banks Insurance Mutual Investment UE & PF All
Companies Funds Advisors Institutions
1982 10.48 12.50 14.86 13.44 9.73 11.88
1984 4.99 6.23 8.16 6.76 5.08 5.97
1986 9.84 11.35 13.48 13.43 12.35 11.87
1988 1.96 2.37 2.82 3.23 2.15 2.59
1990 4.78 5.98 6.39 6.16 4.70 5.59
1992 9.05 10.08 14.69 12.45 8.64 11.20
1994 5.56 7.89 11.12 8.86 5.40 7.95
1996 4.51 7.55 9.65 8.67 5.02 7.70
1998 6.00 7.60 8.87 7.95 4.79 7.63
2000 7.18 10.06 11.14 10.43 9.85 9.83
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Table 8. Performance of institutional portfolio invested in recent IPOs and SEOs (Q4 1993 -- Q4 2000)
The table shows intercepts from a regression of quarterly returns of institutional portfolios invested in IPOs (SEOs) on the Fama-
French factors. Stocks in the institutional portfolio that had a public offering within 16 months of the end of quarter t are included
in the return calculation for quarter t+1. Individual stock returns are weighted by total holdings of all institutions in a given
category (e.g. Banks) at the end of quarter t. Newey-West t-statistics are in [square brackets]. UE & PF stands for University
Endowments and Pension Funds.
The intercepts for a Buy-and-hold Benchmark are computed similarly. The benchmark portfolio includes all stocks that had a
public offering within 16 months of the end of quarter t. Value-weighted returns use market capitalisation at the end of quarter t.
Banks Insurance Mutual Investment UE & PF All Buy-and-hold
Companies Funds Advisors Institutions Benchmark
EW VW
IPOs 1.67 1.17 3.02 2.59 1.12 2.18 -2.49 -0.90
[t-stat] [1.34] [1.32] [1.73] [1.83] [0.96] [1.62] [-2.27] [-1.26]
SEOs -1.02 -1.39 -0.29 -0.42 -0.68 -0.59 -2.59 -2.79
[t-stat] [-1.83] [-2.71] [-0.37] [-0.51] [-0.81] [-0.80] [-6.03] [-3.73]
Table 9. Institutional reaction to analyst recommendations
For each quarter, I run a cross-sectional regression of changes in institutional holdings on analyst
recommendations and control variables. The table shows time-series averages and t-statistics for
the recommendation coefficients from the 29 quarterly regressions. Coefficients are in percent
per quarter. For value-weighted results, observation for each stock is weighted by the market size
of that stock at the end of the preceeding quarter.
Recommendation variables are measured as logarithm of one plus the number of
recommendations.
The five institutional manager types are combined into two categories. B / IC / PF includes
Banks, Insurance Companies, and University Endowments and Pension Funds. MF / IA consists
of Mutual Funds and Investment Advisors.
In Panels A and B, recommendations by all analysts are pooled together. Panels C - F include
Lead and Non-Lead recommendations separately.
Panel A. IPOs, All recommendations
Equal-weighted position changes Value-weighted position changes
All Recommendations All Recommendations
Manager Type Str. Buy Buy Hold/Sell Str. Buy Buy Hold/Sell
B/IC /PF 0.38 0.18 -0.24 0.59 0.06 -0.21
[t-stat] [3.11] [1.44] [-1.11] [1.62] [0.25] [-0.45]
MF/IA 1.26 0.80 -1.79 1.96 0.72 -1.56
[t-stat] [7.30] [4.08] [-6.12] [4.13] [1.58] [-2.15]
All Institutions 1.64 1.00 -2.02 2.55 0.78 -1.76
[t-stat] [7.15] [3.84] [-4.36] [3.50] [1.27] [-1.57]
Panel B. SEOs, All recommendations
Equal-weighted position changes Value-weighted position changes
All Recommendations All Recommendations
Manager Type Str. Buy Buy Hold/Sell Str. Buy Buy Hold/Sell
B/IC/PF 0.40 0.13 -0.64 0.14 0.11 -0.44
[t-stat] [5.87] [1.61] [-6.30] [2.21] [0.90] [-4.47]
MF/IA 1.28 0.13 -2.95 0.10 0.02 -1.31
[t-stat] [5.35] [1.10] [-15.38] [0.63] [0.14] [-6.94]
All Institutions 1.68 0.31 -3.62 0.23 0.16 -1.77
[t-stat] [7.15] [1.83] [-13.53] [1.24] [0.66] [-8.05]
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Table 9 (Cont'd). Institutional reaction to analyst recommendations
Panel 0. IPOs, Lead vs. Non-Lead recommendations, value-weighted position changesI Lead Recommendations j Non-Lead Recommendations
Sir. Buy Buy Hold/Sell [ Sir. Buy Buy Hold/Sell
B/IC/PF -1.63 0.10 -0.87 0.71 -0.05 -0.10
[i-stat] [-2.26] [0.25] [-1.06] [2.04] [-0.18] [-0.23]
MF / IA 0.82 0.66 -3.91 2.02 0.51 -1.42
[i-stat] [0.65] [0.66] [-2.05] [3.66] [1.15] [-1.75]
All Institutions -0.80 0.76 -4.76 2.74 0.47 -1.52
[t-stat] [-0.61] [0.67] [-1.90] [3.33] [0.72] [-1.31]
Panel D. IPOs, Lead vs. Non-Lead recommendations, equal-weighted position changesI Lead Recommendations [ Non-Lead Recommendations
Sir. Buy Buy Hold/Sell [ Sir. Buy Buy Hold/Sell
B/IC/PF -0.64 0.14 -1.01 0.46 0.12 -0.08
[i-stat] [-1.67] [0.67] [-3.56] [3.79] [1.041 [-0.40]
MF / IA 0.93 0.00 -2.96 1.31 0.80 -1.42
[i-stat] [1.42] [0.01] [-4.39] [6.89] [4.53] [-5.17]
All lnstitutions 0.33 0.15 -3.88 1.77 0.92 -1.50
[i-stat] [0.61] [0.28] [-4.78] [6.92] [4.94] [-3.64]
Panel E. SEOs, Lead vs. Non-Lead recommendations, value-weighted position changesI Lead Recommendations [ Non-Lead Recommendations
______________ Sir. Buy Buy Hold/Sell [ Sir. Buy Buy Hold/Sell
B/lC/PF -0.12 0.05 -0.96 0.14 0.15 -0.44
[i-stat] [-0.35] [0.33] [-2.25] [1.83] [1.18] [-4.35]
MF/IA 0.38 -0.23 -4.69 0.08 0.05 -1.19
[t-stat] [0.62] [-0.46] [-4.45] [0.44] [0.32] [-6.60]
All Institutions 0.27 -0.19 -5.60 0.21 0.24 -1.66
[i-stat] [0.32] [-0.32] [-6.02] [0.90] [0.91] [-7.98]
Panel F. SEOs, Lead vs. Non-Lead recommendations, equal-weighted position changesI Lead Recommendations [ Non-Lead Recommendations
Sir. Buy Buy Hold/Sell [ Str. Buy Buy Hold/Sell
B / IC / PF 0.90 0.59 -0.85 0.33 0.10 -0.62
[i-stat] [3.92] [3.21] [-2.43] [4.51] [1.39] [-6.32]
MF/ IA 2.76 0.64 -4.82 0.97 0.13 -2.69
[i-stat] [6.17] [1.54] [-8.01] [3.97] [0.99] [-14.62]
All Institutions 3.66 1.24 -5.63 1.30 0.29 -3.33
[t-stat] [6.50] [2.41] [-8.46] [5.16] [1.62] [-13.00]
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Table 10. Stock performance conditioned on analyst and institutional actions
For each quarter t, I run cross-sectional regressions of stocks' abnormal returns in quarter t+1 on analyst recommendations and demeaned
changes in institutional holdings (A%) during the current quarter, and the interaction terms between these two sets of variables. The table
reports time-series averages of the coefficients from the 29 quarterly regressions. Significance levels are based on the corresponding t-
statistics. Abnormal return for each stock is an intercept from the regression of daily stock returns during quarter t+1 on the Fama-French
factors. Coefficients are reported in basis points per day. Observation for each stock is weighted by the market size of that stock at the end of
quarter t. The * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.
Recommendation variables are measured as logarithm of one plus the number of recommendations.
The five institutional manager types are combined into two categories. B I IC / PF includes Banks, Insurance Companies, and University
Endowments and Pension Funds. MF / IA consists of Mutual Funds and Investment Advisors.
Panel A. IPOs, value-weighted abnormal returns
(1): Position Change (2): Position Change and Rec'ns (3): Interaction Terms
Regressors B/IC/PF MF/IA AllInst'ns IB/IC/PF MF/IA AIInst'ns B/lC/PF MF/IA Alllnst'ns
Constant 1.78 1.59 1.65 -1.24 -1.20 -1.28 -1.52 -2.08 -2.16
Str Buy (Lead) -16.71 * -18.08 * -15.50 -19.83 ** -8.83 -8.09
Str Buy (Non-Lead) 2.10 1.00 1.33 -0.06 -1.37 -0.91
Buy (Lead) 10.60 ** 11.53 ** 11.23 ** -8.86 3.30 3.58
Buy (Non-Lead) 2.18 1.98 1.97 3.50 3.79 * 3.52 *
Hold/Sell (Lead) 5.24 7.65 7.71 0.76 -8.73 -25.95
Hold/Sell (Non-Lead) 2.34 3.72 3.35 3.67 6.02 6.57
Position Change (A%) 0.14 0.47 ** 0.30 * 0.23 0.44 * 0.29 * 0.26 0.56 0.41
A% X Str Buy (Lead) -0.75 -0.78 -1.19
A% X Str Buy (Non-Ld) -0.42 0.03 0.03
A% X Buy (Lead) 0.62 0.01 0.01
A% X Buy (Non-Lead) -0.68 -0.35 -0.10
A% X Hold/Sell (Lead) -9.96 -3.83 ** -6.44 **
A% X Hold/Sell (Non-Ld) 0.52 -0.37 -0.20
Coeff't diff. (Ld -- Non-Ld):
Strong Buy -18.81 * -19.08 ** -16.83 *
Buy 8.41 9.56 9.27
Table 10 (Cont'd). Stock performance conditioned on analyst and institutional actions
Panel B. SEOs, value-weighted abnormal returns
(1): Position Change (2): Position Change and Rec'ns (3): Interaction Terms
Regressors IB / IC /PF MF / IA All Inst'ns B /IC/ PF MF / IA All Inst'ns B / IC / PF MF / IA All Inst'i
Constant -0.11 -0.15 -0.15 1.70 1.55 1.55 1.49 1.50 1.52
Str Buy (Lead) -2.16 -2.60 -2.32 -1.91 -3.78 -3.61
Str Buy (Non-Lead) -1.80 -1.91 -1.88 -1.46 -2.44 ** -2.26
Buy (Lead) -3.69 -3.79 -3.90 -4.40 -4.02 -4.49
Buy (Non-Lead) -1.01 -0.84 -0.85 -1.07 -0.60 -0.65
Hold/Sell (Lead) -1.91 -1.66 -1.53 -3.96 -5.02 -9.65
Hold/Sell (Non-Lead) 0.62 0.72 0.67 0.84 1.05 0.86
Position Change (A%) -0.06 0.08 0.06 -0.18 0.06 0.03 -0.07 -0.16 -0.08
A% X Str Buy (Lead) -0.82 0.27 -0.02
A% X Str Buy (Non-Ld) -0.09 -0.06 -0.04
A% X Buy (Lead) -1.33 0.44 0.25
A% X Buy (Non-Lead) -0.10 0.36 ** 0.24
A% X Hold/Sell (Lead) 1.40 0.18 -0.59
A% X Hold/Sell (Non-Ld) 0.52 0.04 0.08
Coeff't diff. (Ld -- Non-Ld):





Table 11. Performance of issues wlo Lead recommendations
The table shows intercepts obtained by regressing quarterly returns of a portfolio
containing stocks without Lead analyst recommendations on the Fama-French
factors. The analysis only uses stocks within the first year after issuance. In panel
A, the portfolio is formed similarly to the passive benchmark (see Table 1
description), except that only stocks without any Lead recommendation during the
first year after issuance are eligible for inclusion. The returns on the passive
benchmark from Table 1 are shown for comparison. In panel B, the portfolio in
quarter q+1 includes stocks without any Lead recommendation in the preceding
quarter. For comparison, I compute the corresponding intercept of a portfolio
containing all stocks with Lead 'Strong Buy' recommendation during the preceding
quarter.
Panel A. Issues w/o Lead recommendations in the first year
Quarterly intercepts from a 3-factor model
Issues w/o rec'ns Passive benchmark
EW VW EW VW
IPOs -1.41 -1.54 -2.53 -0.82
[-1.60] [-1.41] [-2.07] [-0.95]
SEOs -2.11 -1.11 -2.54 -2.63
[-3.88] [-1.14] [-5.36] [-3.14]
Panel B. Issues w/o Lead recommendations in a given quarter
Quarterly intercepts from a 3-factor model
Issues w/o rec'ns Lead Strong Buy rec'ns
EW VW EW VW
IPOs -3.47 -2.35 -4.88 -2.39
[-2.56] [-1.89] [-2.66] [-1.33]
SEOs -2.65 -2.22 -2.84 -3.12
[-4.95] [-2.38] [-3.79] [-1.61]
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Figure 1a. Timing of analyst recommendations for IPOs during the first year after offering.
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Figure 1 b. Timing of analyst recommendations for SEOs during the first year after offering.
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Chapter 2
How to Tell If a Money Manager
Knows More?
2.1 Introduction
Money managers often claim that they can make better investment decisions than investors
themselves. However, how to evaluate a money manager's ability to do so remains a chal-
lenging question. The traditional approach to evaluate a manager's ability is to measure the
excess return of his portfolio, adjusted for risk according to a model (Sharpe (1966), Jensen
(1969), Treynor and Black (1973)). This approach crucially relies on the specific risk model
it uses (such as the CAPM or a linear multi-factor model). If the risk model is mis-specified,
the ability measure becomes questionable.
In this paper, we pursue a different approach to evaluate money managers that does not
rely on a specific risk model. We start by assuming that a money manager is valuable only
if he brings additional information into the investment process.' Thus, a basic question in
evaluating a manager is whether or not he has private information about future asset returns.2
If the answer is affirmative, the returns he generates must reflect his private information.
'A money manager can be valuable in other ways such as having the ability to implement simple invest-
ment strategies at lower costs. In this paper, we ignore these possibilities.
2It is conceivable that a money manager might possess valuable information about things other than future
asset returns that are also valuable, such as investors' future consumption needs and financial constraints.
Although we do not consider these possibilities in this paper, our methodology can be extended to include
them.
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In particular, investment strategies without the benefit of this information cannot generate
the same returns. Thus, by examining the managers' returns, we should be able to identify
those that reflect private information from those that do not. We explore methods to do so
based on the managers' trading records.
Conceptually, we can decompose the evaluation of money managers into two steps. The
first step is to identify managers who bring new information into the investment process
and the second step is to determine the "value" of their information. The first step need
not rely on any specific risk model, but the second step does. The traditional approach
combines the two steps by directly analyzing the value-added of a manager. Such a direct
approach is desirable, and is possible if an appropriate risk model is available. However, if
the appropriate risk model is absent or mis-specified in the analysis, this approach becomes
ineffective and potentially misleading.
The contribution of a money manager is to generate returns that investors cannot achieve
on their own. These returns fall into two categories. The first category contains returns that
represent arbitrage profits and the second category contains the rest. Arbitrage profits
are considered by Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton (1981), and they only arise
under restrictive conditions.3 For example, in the case considered by Merton, the manager
has perfect information about the direction of future price movements. 4 When the market is
complete with respect to the arbitrage profits considered, their evaluation is straightforward,
at least conceptually. When the market is incomplete, the value of arbitrage profits is harder
to determine, but is always positive.5
Short of being arbitrage profits, money manager's returns are difficult to value. The
3 See Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986), Cumby and Modest (1987), Glosten and Jagannathan (1994),
Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ivkovi6 (2000) for applications and extensions
of the Henriksson-Merton methodology. The stochastic discount factor (SDF) framework for performance
evaluation, which is similar in spirit to Merton's original idea, is reviewed in Ferson (2002). See also Chen
and Knez (1996) and Farnsworth, Ferson, Jackson and Todd (2002) for applications of the SDF methodology.
4Merton (1981) and Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) also considered extensions of their analysis when
profits have the nature of "risky arbitrages". Using APT type of arguments (Ross, (1976)), they treat these
as equivalent to arbitrage profits ("approximate arbitrages"). But, "risky arbitrages" belong to the second
category, which we discuss below.
5 The case of arbitrage profits raises the issue of how they can be consistent with an equilibrium. In the
model Merton (1981) considered, the manager knows for sure when the stock will out- or under-perform the
bond. Thus, he disagrees with investors on the support for future stock prices. Further constraints (e.g.,
Dybvig and Willard (1999)) or behavior assumptions (e.g. Kyle (1985)) on the manager are needed to obtain
a sustainable equilibrium in this situation.
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main difficulty comes from the risky nature of these returns. The traditional approach relies
on a specific risk model to overcome this difficulty. But it has long been recognized that
the possibility of using a wrong model can be devastating. 6 Actually, the difficulty goes
beyond the search of the "correct" risk model. The very existence of such a risk valuation
model is much in question. It is important to realize that based on his private information,
an informed manager sees a different return distribution than that seen by an investor.
Thus, he uses a different risk model (see, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Admati and
Ross (1985) and Wang (1993)). Using the investor's own model to evaluate the manager
is conceptually problematic, since it is based on inferior information. Yet, most traditional
evaluation methods, such as those of Sharpe (1966), Jensen (1969) and Treynor and Black
(1973), take this approach. In fact, the investor can reach wrong conclusions using his own
model to judge the manager (see, e.g., Dybvig and Ross (1985)). Using the manager's model
is usually infeasible since it is based on his private information. Moreover, even knowing the
money manager's model, an investor may not agree with it since with incomplete markets, his
objective and valuation of returns would generally not coincide with those of the manager. 7
This difficulty in establishing the appropriate risk valuation model justifies our approach,
which focuses on the first question in evaluating a manager: Does he know something that
investors do not? This question is less ambitious, but more direct and basic. Our approach
has the advantage of being independent of the valuation model and the objectives of the
manager and the investors. Its limitations are also obvious compared with the traditional
approach. For example, if our methodology identifies a manager with useful information,
it does not necessarily tell us how valuable that information is to a particular investor, nor
does it allow us to rank the information across different managers.
Our approach is related to the method considered by Cornell (1979), Copeland and May-
ers (1982) and Grinblatt and Titman (1993) for performance evaluation of money managers.
These authors use the predictive power of a manager's asset holdings for average future re-
turns as a measure of their ability.8 This measure is intuitive and does not rely on a risk
6 See, for example, Jensen (1972), Roll (1978), Dybvig and Ross (1985), and Grinblatt and Titman (1989).
TIt should be pointed out that the assumption of complete markets, in addition to being unrealistic,
is inappropriate in dealing with situations when market participants have different information. See, for
example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), and Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
8 See also Cumby and Modest (1987), Graham and Harvey (1996), and Chance and Hemler (2001) for
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model and can detect performance if the manager can forecast average future returns. But
it has several drawbacks. First, it can detect the ability in forecasting mean returns, but not
the ability in forecasting other aspects of future returns, such as volatility. Second, it applies
mainly when the returns are IID from investors' point of view. If the returns are non-IID, the
measure is not directly usable. 9 Third, it is sensitive to the managers' trading strategies. If
there are two managers with the same information on expected future returns, the measure
gives a higher score to the manager who trades more aggressively on the information. Our
approach is in the same spirit in the sense that it also develops an evaluation method that
does not rely on a risk model. But it is more general and does not have these drawbacks.
Moreover, it can be applied even when we do not observe managers' asset holdings. Our
methodology is very similar to that used by Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) to evaluate the
merit of technical analysis.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2.2, we use a simple example to illustrate the basic
idea of our approach. In Section 2.3, we develop a general method to distinguish informed
managers from uninformed managers based on their trading records. In Section 2.4, we apply
the general methodology to several settings when the managers' positions are observable.
Section 2.5 shows how our procedure can be used when the information about managers'
positions is unavailable. In Section 2.6, we apply our methodology to the comparison of two
managers, and to the situation where managers can trade in-between observations. Section
2.7 contains several robustness checks of our methodology. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 An Example
We start our discussion with the example considered by Dybvig and Ross (1985) to demon-
strate the drawback of the traditional approach. We use this example to illustrate how to
identify a manager with superior private information without relying on any risk model. We
further use this example to raise and to clarify several issues related to our approach.
applications involving evaluation of direct forecasts.
9 Ferson and Khang (2002) have considered the situation of non-IID returns by making additional as-
sumptions about the return dynamics. We return to this issue in more detail in Section 2.4.
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Setup
Suppose that a money manager can invest in cash and a risky asset. Cash earns zero interest
rate, and change in the price of the risky asset in period t - 1 is given by Q+ 1, where
Qt+1 = A + Zt + Ut+1 (2.1)
p is a positive constant, Zt and ut+1 are independent normal random variables, IID over time,
with zero mean and variance o and ar, respectively. Throughout this paper, we model and,
later, simulate price changes of the risky asset, which we also refer to as "dollar return"
or simply "return". For convenience, we refer to the risky asset as a stock and express a
manager's holdings in it as number of shares. We compute Sharpe ratio of a manager by
dividing the mean of her P&L by its standard deviation. These departures from a more
traditional setup are merely for convenience.
We consider two money managers, an uninformed manager, denoted by 0, and an in-
formed manager, denoted by 1. The uninformed manager has no private information about
future returns. To him, stock return is IID over time with a mean of p and a variance of
07 =2 +U - .aThe informed manager has private information about future stock returns.
In particular, she observes Zt at t (t = 0, 1,- ). To her, returns are no longer IID, but
predictable given her information.
Both managers form their investment strategies based on their information about future
returns. Let Nt denote manager i's stock position (expressed in number of shares) at t,




N1= a1 + b (2.2b)
oz
where a0, al and b are all positive constants, presumably depending on the managers'
objective functions, especially their risk tolerances. It can be shown that these strategies are
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optimal given certain form of the managers' objective functions.10 From (2.2a), the portfolio
of the uninformed manager is constant over time, reflecting the fact that he possesses no
information about future stock returns. The portfolio of the informed manager, however,
does change over time as she receives new information about future returns. We define
A = b'/a' as a measure of the informed manager's intensity to trade on her information.
Sharpe Ratio as An Information Identifier
Can we distinguish the informed manager from the uninformed manager, given certain in-
formation on their trading records? The traditional approach to performance evaluation is
to look at the (excess) return of each strategy, adjusted for its risk according to a specific
risk model. A well-known risk model is the mean-variance model, in which the risk-adjusted
measure of excess return is the Sharpe ratio. Given the strategies of the two managers, we
can easily compute their Sharpe ratios, denoted by SRO and SRI, respectively:
5R0 = M ESR* (2.3a)
1+ AR/SR*SR = SR 1+ St+A [R* (2.3b)
V1+2 A R SR* + A2(1 +R 2+SR* 2)
where R2 aC/ou measures the amount of private information the informed manager has
about future returns. It is worth pointing out that the Sharpe ratio of the uninformed
manager is independent of the number of shares he holds. This reflects a desirable property
of the Sharpe ratio in measuring performance: By simply taking on more or less risk, a
manager cannot improve his performance measure. This also implies that the Sharpe ratio
of any uninformed manager can not exceed SR*."
For the informed manager, her Sharpe ratio depends on the specific strategy she follows.
0For example, under a similar return process and constant absolute risk aversion preferences, Wang (1994)
shows that the informed manager's optimal stock holdings are linear in her signal. The linear form assumed
here, however, is for illustrative purposes only. The methodology we develop would work as long as manager's
holdings are monotone in her signal.
"In fact, SR* gives the upper bound for the Sharpe ratio the uninformed manager can achieve. To see
this, let us suppose that the uninformed manager introduces noise into his investment strategy. In particular,
assume his stock position is N 0 = a0 + t, where it is a random variable independent of Z and ut+1 , with
0
a zero mean. It then follows that his Sharpe ratio becomes SR = SR* a which is less than
SR*
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In particular, it may not always exceed that of the uninformed manager (SR*). Figure 2-1
shows the ratio of SR' to SRO as a function of b/al. Here, we have set the annual mean of
the stock return to be p = 0.12 and its volatility to be o,- = 0.15. Thus, the Sharpe ratio
of the stock is SR* = p/o-Q = 0.8 on an annual basis.12 We assume that the managers are
trading on a weekly basis. The R 2 for weekly stock return takes values ranging from 0.5%
to 1%.
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Figure 2-1: Relative Sharpe ratio of the informed and the uninformed manager.
It is obvious that the informed manager can generate Sharpe ratios below SR*, especially
when her private information is limited (low R 2 ) and she trades aggressively on it. As
Dybvig and Ross (1985) have pointed out, the reason for the failure of Sharpe ratio in
detecting the informed manager's superior ability is that volatility as a measure of risk
becomes inappropriate for her P&L profile, which is no longer normal. In particular, the
P&L profile of the informed manager has a X2 component in it, due to the positive correlation
between her position in the stock and its return.
This points to a fundamental drawback of the traditional approach, its reliance on a spe-
cific risk model. Besides the possibility of being mis-specified, a particular risk model is usu-
ally based on the perspective of investors who have no private information. It does not neces-
sarily incorporate the potential private information that better informed investors/managers
might have, and thus may not be the right risk model from their perspective.
12 A Sharpe ratio of 0.8 on annual basis is higher than the historic average for passive strategies. It is
less clear what the reasonable range for active strategies should be. We choose a higher number merely for
illustrative purposes.
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Information Identification without A Risk Model
However, in this example, we do not need a risk model to identify the informed manager.
In fact, simply by looking at the distribution of P&L, we should be able to tell who the
informed manager is. Figure 2-2 shows the unconditional distribution of the P&L for both
the informed and the uninformed manager. Here, for concreteness, we have chosen a0 to be 1.
Thus, the uninformed manager follows a passive strategy and holds one share of stock. The
informed manager has predictive power of R 2 = 1% for future stock return and she actively
trades on her private information. We also set her average stock position to a1 = 1 and the
intensity at which she trades on her information is A* = 0.901.13 However, for comparison,
we consider two values for A: A = A* and A = 5A*.
Empirical PDFs of Various Strategies
--- Uninformed
-- Informed(X=X)
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Figure 2-2: Distribution of the managers' P&L.
It is obvious that the P&L of the informed manager is positively skewed while the P&L
of the uninformed manager is always symmetric (around its mean). Table 2.1.A reports
the moments of the P&L for the two managers. Since the uninformed manager follows a
passive strategy, his P&L has the same moments as the stock dollar return, with a weekly
average gain of 0.231% and volatility of 2.080%. The corresponding Sharpe ratio is 0.111
(weekly). The informed manager, trading on her private information about average future
1 In the portfolio choice problem with CARA preferences and returns given by (2.1), the optimal policies
of the uninformed and the informed managers take the form of (2.2). At the specified parameter values
(p 0.12, o0 = 0.15 and R2 = 1%), a0 = a = 1 implies a risk aversion of 51 for both managers.
Moreover, for the informed manager, A* 0.901 for the optimal policy. Although our analysis does require
any optimality on the manager's part, we use values implied by optimality under CARA preferences in our
numerical illustrations.
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returns, generates large average gains, but with higher volatility. For A = A*, the average
weekly P&L is 0.418% with a volatility of 2.830%, giving a Sharpe ratio of 0.148, which is
significantly higher than that of the uninformed manager. However, when she trades more
aggressively with A = 5A*, her Sharpe ratio starts to fall to the same range as that of the
uninformed manager.
What is worth noting is the symmetric nature of the uninformed manager's return profile.
Given that conditional on public information (which is summarized in the prior distribution
of Zt and ut+i), the stock dollar return is symmetrically distributed, any strategy that
the uninformed manager adopts based on the same public information can only generate
symmetric P&L. This implies that any strategy that can generate an asymmetric P&L
profile must be relying on additional information about stock returns.
Thus, in this example, information revealed by the unconditional distribution of the
managers' P&L is sufficient to identify the informed manager. However, as we will see
later, relying only on the unconditional P&L distribution is restrictive in general. For ex-
ample, using option-like strategies, the uninformed investor can closely mimic the important
characteristics of the unconditional distribution of the informed investor's P&L. Robust
identification of informed managers has to rely on additional information about their trad-
ing records. In particular, when the trading record also contains the history of manager's
positions, we can determine if she has private information by looking at the distribution of
asset returns conditioned on her positions. In particular, future returns conditioned on her
current stock position being above its average must have a different distribution than the
returns conditioned on her current position being lower than its average. In other words, her
current position can predict future returns, which is the point exploited by Cornell (1979)
and Grinblatt and Titman (1993), among others.
Table 2.1.B reports the moments of stock returns conditioned on the informed manager's
stock position being above and below average. Clearly, conditioned on the informed man-
ager's stock position being above average, the future stock returns have a positive mean
and skewness, and conditioned on her stock position being below average, the future stock
returns have a negative mean and skewness.
Figure 2-3(a) plots the stock return distribution conditional on the manager's position
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Figure 2-3: Comparison of conditional and unconditional distributions of stock dollar return:
PDFs (Panel A) and CDF differences (Panel B). Distributions conditioned on the manager's stock
position being above and below average are denoted by the dashed and dotted lines, respectively.
The solid line in Figure 2-3(a) gives the unconditional distribution.
being above and below average. It is obvious that for the uninformed investor, the two
distributions should be identical and equal to the unconditional distribution. They are
shown in the figure by the solid line. For the informed manager, the dollar return distribution
conditional on her position being below average is shown by the dotted line, and the dollar
return distribution conditional on her position being above average is shown by the dashed
line. Clearly, the two distributions are different and the former lies to the left of the latter.
The difference between the two conditional distributions unambiguously demonstrates that
manager's position contains information about future returns.
Given that predictive power of the informed manager's signal about future stock return
has an R 2 of only 1%, the differences between the conditional distributions (when her position
is above and below average, respectively) and the unconditional distribution, as shown in
Figure 2-3(a), may seem small. But they may well be detectable statistically, depending on
the methods used. In particular, the difference between the cumulative density function of
the conditional distribution and the unconditional distribution is quite significant as Figure
2-3(b) shows. The test we consider later is related to this observation.
The above example illustrates our basic idea in this paper, which is to identify managers
who have private information about future returns. We explore methods to achieve this by
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relying solely on the managers' trading records, not on any particular notion of risk.
Obviously, this example is special in many ways, such as the return generating process, the
nature of the informed manager's private information, the information we have on managers'
trading records, etc. This raises many questions about how far we can push our idea in more
general settings. For example, the asymmetry in the informed manager's P&L profile is
related to the fact that her information is about the mean of future stock return. If her
information is about the volatility of future stock return, can we still identify any special
features of her P&L profile? What if her information is about some aspect of future stock
returns, which we do not even know? Also, we have assumed that we have information
about managers' portfolio P&L at the same horizon as their trading period. What if we only
observe P&L at a horizon that is longer than their trading period? In this case, dynamic
trading strategies within the horizon over which we record P&L can generate a rich set of
P&L profiles even when they are only based on public information. Can we still tell if a
strategy contains new information? We will address these questions in the following sections.
2.3 Methodology
We now consider a methodology that allows us to separate an informed manager from an
uninformed manager. The effectiveness of any such methodology depends on two factors:
(1) the underlying model, including the return generating process, the nature of private
information, and the trading strategy, and (2) the amount of data, including the length of
managers' trading records. Of course, less reliance on both of these factors is more desirable.
For most of our discussion, we assume that sufficient data is available, and focus primarily
on the first factor. We return to the data issue in Section 2.7.
Our methodology is based on the availability of managers' trading records. Let NI and
Qt denote manager i stock position and the realized stock return over time. Define
G> N/_iQt (2.4)
as the P&L of manager i in period t where t= 1,.. .T. Let (-)[1,T] denote the history of
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a variable from time 1 to T. We assume that a manager's trading record always includes
G,T], his P&L. It also includes public information such as past returns on the stock and
realizations of certain events or state variables (e.g., realized earnings or success/failure of
mergers). In addition, it may contain more detailed information, such as the manager's
positions. Formally, the trading record (history) of manager i is given by
HT - (G, Q, S9 )"
- { (G, Q1, S) , (G, Q2, Si) ,. .. , (G, QT, SJ1)} . (2.5)
Here, S represents the information on the manager's trading history in addition to his P&L
and stock returns. We consider two possible forms of S in this paper. In the first instance,
S = NJ is the manager's stock position. In the second instance, S is the ex-post realization
of a state variable X that affects the distribution of future stock return and on which the
manager might have private information. For example, if the manager trades on information
about earnings, the actual earnings realizations are observable and constitute an important
part of his trading record. In the first case, we assume that the manager's position is a
monotonic function of X. In the second case, S' is monotonic in X by construction.
2.3.1 Positions As Part of Trading Record
We first consider the situation where S = NJ, that is, the manager i's trading positions
are available for his evaluation. In this case, Hf = (G, Q, N)[lT] (notice that since G=
N> iQt, we can drop G' from H in this setting). If manager i trades on private information
about future returns, his stock position at any point in time must reflect this information.
In particular, conditional on his position in the stock, the distribution of future returns must
be different from the unconditional distribution of returns.
Let
FA(x) F (Qt+I<; xNJ c A) (2.6)
denote the cumulative density function of the stock dollar return next period conditioned on
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manager i's current stock position N being in set A, where A is a Lebesgue-measurable set
on R. If Nt contains no information about Qt±1, we have
FA(.) = FA(-) V A, A'. (2.7)
If, however, N contains information about Qt+i, then we have
FA(-)$FA{) V A/A'. (2.8)
Thus, the problem of identifying the informed manager reduces to the task of distinguish-
ing the two conditional return distributions. The null hypothesis to be tested is simply
(2.7). Instead of making assumptions about the return generating process, we rely on the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is distribution-free.
For manager i, FA(x) and FA, (x) denote the cumulative return distribution functions
conditioned on his stock position being in A and A', respectively. The null hypothesis is
that F,, = FA. The estimated cumulative distribution function F, (S = A, A') based on the
trading record of manager i with sample size n, is given by
Fs(x) vZ1<;QtxNt_ 1ES} (2-9)
t=1
where 1{.1 is the indicator function. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic based on the esti-
mated distributions is
A(nAn)A' 1/2 sup F()-?FA(x) (2.10)
)A7A/ n( A + T AnA -OO<X<OC
The distribution of 6(nA, nA') under the null can be readily computed (see, for example,
Hollander and Wolfe (1999), Table A.10). We can perform an approximate a-level test of
the null hypothesis by computing the statistic and rejecting the null if it exceeds the lOO1-th
percentile of its distribution under the null.
When nA and ni are large, the statistic should be small under the null. In particular,
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when min(nA, nA') -+ cc, it has the following limiting distribution:
lim Prob(6((n, nA) < ) = (- 1 )k-2k2 62 (2.11)
min(nA ,nA') hmk=-oo
Assuming, without loss of generality, that nA > nA, this approximation is valid for nA 100,
nA > [0.10nA].4 An approximate a-level test of the null hypothesis can be performed based
on the limiting distribution of the test statistic under the null, given by (2.11).
To implement the test proposed above, we need to choose the sets A and A'. The choice
depends on several factors. In order to increase the power of the test, we want to choose A
and A' such that the difference between the two conditional distributions, as measured by the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, is maximized. Also, we want to use the data most efficiently.
Any particular choice of A and A' involves a trade off between these two considerations.
Suppose that on average, the managers' stock position is zero. Then, one choice is to let
A = (-oo, oc) and A' = (-oo, 0] or A' = (0, oo). Another choice is to let A = (-cc, 0]
and A' = (0, oo).' Both choices use all observations. But the second choice gives a larger
difference between FA and FA. Therefore, setting A = (-oc, 0] and A' = (0, cc), our test
becomes the test of the hypothesis that F+ = F_, where
F+(x)=_ F(Qt+il<xINt 0) and F_ (x) -_F(Qt+1<IjNt > 0). (2.12)
Since the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test makes no assumptions about the actual return distri-
bution, it can detect any difference in the distributions conditioned on a manager's position.
In particular, the private information that gives rise to this difference does not have to be
limited to expected returns; it can involve better forecasts about other moments of returns
as well. We consider this case in Section 2.4.2.
In the above discussion, we assume that the uninformed manager as well as the evaluator
have no information about future returns. In other words, conditioned on their information,
14 See Kim and Jennrich (1973). The numerical results presented later in the paper also use the conti-
nuity correction suggested by these authors, which amounts to adding 1/(2,_A) to the computed value of
6 (nA, nA).
151f the manager's average stock position is not zero, but is N, then we can simply choose A = (OI, N)
and A'= (IV, oc).
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stock returns are IID over time. This is a restrictive assumption. Conditioned on public
information, returns can be non-IID.16 Our method can be easily extended to the case of
non-lID returns. Suppose that the distribution of future stock return Qt+1 depends on public
information Y. Then, for an uninformed manager who nonetheless observes Y at time t, we
have
FA( - Y) =FA,(<IY) V A, A' and Y (2.13)
where F (xlY)-= F(Qt+i xN 1 £ S, Y = Y) is the cumulative distribution of future
stock return conditioned on the current public information being Y- = Y and the stock
position being in the set S = A, A'. In this case, the identification of an informed manager
is equivalent to rejecting the null hypothesis (2.13).
2.3.2 State Variable(s) As Part of Trading Record
We have developed the methodology to identify informed managers under the assumption
that their positions are available to us for evaluation. Now we consider the case when such
data is not observable. Suppose, instead, that we have ex-post realizations of a state variable
X about which managers may have private information. Our procedure can be modified to
detect those informed managers. In this case, HT = (G', Q, X)[,T].
The intuition behind our methodology in this case is as follows. Controlling for stock
return, the only source of variation in manager's P&L is his position in the stock. If he
has information about the state variable X, the variation in his position is related to the
variation in X. Therefore, conditioned on the stock return, the distribution of his P&L
when X is "low" should be different from the conditional distribution of his P&L when X is
"high". Thus, identifying an informed manager again reduces to comparing two conditional
distributions, except that in this setting the test is applied to the distribution of manager's
P&L rather than to the distribution of asset returns.
16There are many papers documenting the serial dependence in stock returns. For example, Fama and
French (1988b), Lo and MacKinlay (1988), and Poterba and Summers (1988) have shown serial correlation
in stock index returns at different horizons. Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1988a), and
Kothari and Shanken (1997) show that dividend yield can predict future returns. Bollerslev, Chou and
Kroner (1992), among others, survey evidence on predictability in stock return volatility.
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Let
Fs(x IQ) E F (G <; Xt 1 c S, Qt = Q) (214)
denote the cumulative distribution of a manager's P&L conditioned on the concurrent stock
return being Qt = Q and the state variable X being in the set S = A, A'. Then, under the
null hypothesis that a manager has no information about X, we must have
FAG( - |Q) = F, (- |Q) V A, A'and Q. (2.15)
Rejection of this null hypothesis implies that a manager has private information about X.
The test of the null on the distribution of P&L conditioned on the realization of state
variables can be constructed in the same way as the test on the distribution of stock returns
conditioned on the manager's positions and public information. Here, the return on the
stock plays the same role as the public signal does when returns are non-IID.
2.4 Analysis When Positions Are Observable
In this section, we apply the methodology proposed in the previous section to simulated
trading records of managers under the assumption that their stock position is observable to
us. We first consider the setting that corresponds to the example described in Section 2.2,
where returns are IID over time and the informed manager has private information about the
mean of future returns. We then extend our analysis to the situation where the manager's
private signal is about the volatility of future returns. Next, we show how to apply our
methodology when returns are non-IID. Finally, we consider a setting where managers can
invest in multiple risky assets.
Relying on managers' positions to identify an informed manager was suggested by Cornell
(1979), Copeland and Mayers (1982), Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Ferson and Khang
(2002). In particular, they use the covariance between a manager's asset positions and subse-
quent returns as a performance measure. This measure is intuitive and has simple economic
interpretations. But it is applicable only to the case when the manager's information is on
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the mean of asset returns. It is also sensitive to how aggressively a manager trades on his
information. Finally, it requires asset returns to be IID based on public informaiton. Ferson
and Khang extend the methodology to non-IID returns. But they impose additional struc-
ture on the asset return process. The analysis in this section shows that our approach avoids
these limitations. Its application based on managers' positions is a natural generalization of
the existing methodology.
2.4.1 lID Returns: Mean
Consider the simple case in which stock dollar return is given by (2.1) and the informed
manager observes Zt at time t. We use the following annual parameter values: M = 0.12
and JQ = 0.15. R 2 , which measures the predictive power of the informed manager's private
information, is set at 5%. The portfolio strategies of the uninformed and informed managers
are given by (2.2). In particular, the stock position of the informed manager is linear in Z,.
The intensity of her trading on the private information is measured by A.
Weekly stock returns are generated by simulating (2.1) for 400 weeks. The stock price
is initialized to $1, which allows us to interpret stock returns as (simple) returns per dollar
invested at time 0. Each simulation gives us a time series of Qt, Z_1 and the managers' stock
positions N_i with i =0, 1. The simulated trading record of manager i is (Q, N')[o,400 ]. The
simulation is repeated 500 times to obtain various statistics and their standard errors.
The uninformed manager (manager 0) follows a passive strategy with N = a0. For
concreteness, we set a0 = 1. In other words, he holds one share of stock. We also consider
an uninformed manager, denoted as manager 0', who adds noise to his stock holdings. This
manager has no private information about future stock returns, but thinks that he does.
He treats noise as signals about future returns, and trades on it. His stock position is
N?' = a 0 ± + where a 0 = 1 and ii, is normal, independent of Q, with a mean of zero and a
volatility of 0.5. The informed manager follows an active strategy NJ = a(1+ AZt/oz). Her
average position in the stock is a1 , which is also set to 1. The benchmark value of A for this
case is A* = 2.016." To assess how manager's trading intensity affects our methodology, we
17 The benchmark value of 2.016 for A is optimal if the manager has a CARA preferences with a risk
aversion of 51, which gives a1 = 1. See footnote 13.3,
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consider two values of A: A = A* and A = 5*.
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of the P&L of the uninformed
managers with and without noise, and of the informed manager with different intensities
of her informed trading. The strategy of the uninformed manager without noise is passive,
buy-and-hold. The moments of his P&L are equal to those of stock dollar return, which has
weekly average gain of 0.231%, volatility of 2.084%, and a Sharpe ratio of 0.111. The skewness
is zero and kurtosis is 3. The strategy of the uninformed manager with noise is active but
not rewarding. His average weekly P&L of 0.234% is comparable to the passive strategy,
but the volatility of 2.331% is higher than that for the passive strategy. The skewness of his
P&L distribution is still approximately zero, but the kurtosis becomes 5.038 (with a standard
deviation of 1.138). The noise in the uninformed manager's strategy reduces his Sharpe ratio
to 0.101 (with a standard deviation of 0.049). The P&L of the informed manager gives a
different pattern. It tends to have higher average gain and volatility than the P&L of the
buy-and-hold uninformed manager. But in general, the informed manager achieves larger
Sharpe ratios. For A = A*, her Sharpe ratio is 0.242, which is considerably higher than the
Sharpe ratio of the uninformed manager. However, as A increases, i.e. when the informed
manager trades more aggressively on her information, the Sharpe ratio may decline, as shown
in Figure 2-1. More importantly, the distribution of the informed manager's P&L is very
different from those of the uninformed managers. In particular, it shows significant positive
skewness, as discussed earlier. For A = A*, the skewness is 1.28 (with a standard deviation
of 0.55).
In the particular case we consider here, the unconditional distribution of the P&L of
the informed manager provides strong evidence of her having private information about
stock returns. However, this situation is special. As we show later, the evidence from the
unconditional distribution of P&L is insufficient and can be misleading. For this reason,
we utilize the methodology discussed in Section 2.3 and construct tests based on the stock
return distribution conditioned on the managers' positions.
Let N denote the average of a manager's stock position over the simulated sample.
We partition the sample into two sets, those with Nt < N and those with Nt > R. We
have n_ and n+ sample points in the two sets. For each set, we use (2.9) to estimate
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conditional cumulative distribution of stock dollar return, F_ and F+, respectively. We also
use the whole sample to compute the unconditional cumulative stock return distribution
F. Table 2.2.B reports the summary statistics for the unconditional distribution and for
the two conditional distributions. The unconditional distribution of stock return is normal
with mean of 0.231% and standard deviation of 2.084%. Its skewness is zero and kurtosis
is 3, as expected. The average return conditioned on the informed manager's position being
above average is 0.604%, significantly higher than the unconditional mean. Conditioned on
the manager's stock position being below average, the mean return is negative, -0.141%,
which is lower than the unconditional mean and a lot smaller than the mean conditioned
on her position being above average. The difference between the means of the conditional
distributions reflects the private information the manager has about average future returns,
as we assumed. The other moments of the conditional distributions are very similar to those
of the unconditional distribution. The standard deviation of the conditional distributions
is slightly lower than that of the unconditional distribution on average, but the difference
is not statistically significant because the R 2 of the manager's signal is only 5%. The third
and fourth moments of the conditional distributions are practically the same as those of
the unconditional distribution. It is also worth noting that the moments of the conditional
distribution do not depend on the intensity at which the manager trades on her private
information (as long as it is not zero). The moments are essentially the same for different
values of A. This is not surprising. When the manager's stock position is linear in her
signal about future stock return (Q,), as we assume here, conditioning on her position being
above average is equivalent to conditioning on the signal being positive, i.e., Z_ 1 > 0. The
magnitude of A has no impact on the information revealed by the relative size of her position.
We apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to each pair of the estimated distributions: F+
versus F F versus F, and F+ versus F_, which allows us to accept or reject the null hy-
pothesis (2.7) at a given confidence level. For each simulation, we compute the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test statistic and the corresponding p-value. The rejection rate at the 1% (5%) level
is a fraction of simulations for which the p-value does not exceed .01 (.05). The standard
deviation of the test statistic is shown for information purposes only.
Table 2.3 reports the results of the test. In the first panel, we have the Kolmogorov-
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Smirnov test statistic 6 for the uninformed manager who trades on noise. It is clear that
6 is close to zero. The rejection rate of the null hypothesis that the two conditional P&L
distributions and the unconditional P&L distribution are the same is close to zero at both
the 1% level and the 5% level. For the informed manager, the test statistic becomes larger
and more significant. However, the rejection rate of the null that F+ = F or F_ =F
is still low, about 2% at the 1% level and 13-16% at the 5% level. But for the null that
F+ = F-, the rejection rate becomes very high, 69% at the 1% level and 88% at the 5% level.
This is not surprising, since the difference between F+ and F_ is larger than the difference
between either F and F+ or P and FL. It should also be pointed out that the results of the
test are independent of the intensity at which the informed manager trades on her private
information. This is clearly a desirable property of our evaluation method.
The above analysis of a simple case demonstrates the applicability of our methodology
in identifying managers with private information. In the remainder of this section, we apply
the same methodology to more general cases.
2.4.2 IID Returns: Volatility
In the preceding analysis, we have assumed that the informed manager has private informa-
tion about the mean of future returns. We have shown that our methodology can be used
to detect the informed manager in this case. As we discussed earlier, unlike other methods
that can reveal the presence of such information, our procedure does not put any restrictions
on the nature of manager's private information. In order to demonstrate this, we consider a
situation where the informed manager has private information about the volatility of future
returns rather than the mean. Suppose that stock price increments are generated by the
following process:
Qt+1 = n + Utut+1 (2.16)
where t follows an IID two-point process and ut+1 is IID standard normal. We assume that
t takes two values, -h and a,, with equal probability. The informed manager observes a- at
time t and the uninformed manager does not.
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For our test, we again let M = 0.12 and JQ = 0.15. We set 0-h = 0.20. The unconditional
volatility of stock return then implies that a, = 0.07. In addition to the passive strategy
defined in Section 2.4.1, we consider three active strategies given by Nt = p/(ryv2), where
-Y = 51 as before, and vt = a-t + 5t is a manager's signal about volatility. We use three3
different distributions of Et to simulate an uninformed manager with noise, and partially-
and fully-informed managers.1 8
Based on simulated trading records of the four strategies over a sample of 400 weeks, we
report the summary statistics of their P&L in Panel A of Table 2.4. With private information
only on volatility, the informed manager can still generate a Sharpe ratio of 0.171, which
is noticeably higher than that of a passive strategy (0.107). Panel B of Table 2.4 reports
the stock return moments conditional on the managers' position being above (N > A)
and below (N < N) its average. Apparently, conditioned on the fully-informed manager's
stock position being below average, volatility of stock return is significantly higher than
when her position is above average. The stock position of the partially-informed manager is
also informative. Panel C gives the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test applied to the
conditional return distributions. For the fully-informed manager, the test strongly rejects
the null that the two distributions are the same. Rejection rates for the partially-informed
manager are high as well, even though her Sharpe Ratio of 0.109 is almost the same as that
of the passive strategy.
These results show that our methodology does not rely on the specific nature of the
manager's private information. As long as sufficient data are available, we can identify the
manager with private information.
2.4.3 Non-IID Returns
In the previous two sections, we have assumed that stock returns are IID based on public
information. This is a restrictive assumption. There is accumulating evidence that asset
8 When at = ah, Et takes on two values, 0 and o -Oh, with probability p and I-p, respectively. Similarly,
when at a=1g, Et is either 0 or oa. - o, with respective probabilities of p and 1 - p. Thus, the signal vt has
the same unconditional distribution as at. Straightforward calculations show that the informativeness of the
signal depends on the value of p. For instance, if p = 0.5, the signal is worthless because F(a tvt) = F(at).
We set p = 0.5, p = 0.75, and p = 1.0 to simulate an active uninformed manager, and partially- and
fully-informed managers, respectively.
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return distributions are time-varying. In such a situation, our task becomes to identify
managers whose information about future returns is not in the public information set. For
example, if it is known that the dividend yield predicts future returns, the question is whether
a manager has predictors in addition to the dividend yield.
In the context of the setting considered in Section 2.4.1, we assume that stock price
increments are generated by the following process:
Qt+1 = A + Yt + Z + Ut+1 (2.17)
where p is a positive constant, Yi, Zt and ut+i are independent normal, IID over time, with
zero mean and volatility a-, a,,, and om, respectively. Moreover, we assume that Y is public
information at time t and Zt is private information, known only to the informed manager.
The price process (2.17) is a straightforward extension of the simple case (2.1). However,
since Yj is public information at t, stock returns conditioned on this information are no longer
IID over time.
As discussed in Section 2.3, our methodology can be extended naturally to analyze this
case. We only need to condition on the public information first and compare the distribution
of returns conditioned on the managers' stock positions. The implementation of this idea is
straightforward if we have unlimited amount of data on the managers' trading records. In
practice, data is always limited. Thus, we again face the challenge of finding a powerful test
with limited amount of data.
We consider the following algorithm. Given a manager's trading record (Q, N, Y)[oT,)
we divide the sample into m equal-sized bins according to the value of Y. Each bin now
provides a controlled sample in which the values of Y are clustered within a close range. Let
n - T/m be the number of observations in each bin. One can then construct a test based
on the sample {(Ntkl, Qtkl), . . , (Nt_-17, Qtl)},) where k = 1,. . . , m denotes the k-th bin.
We compute the average position Ak for the sub-sample k and then divide the sub-sample
into two groups: J+(k) = {j :NtJ > Fk } and J_(k) {j Ntk <; Nj. Conditional
distributions of stock return, F+(k) and F_(k), can be estimated based on the two groups
in the sub-sample k as for the IID case. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be conducted on the
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1+(k) and F_(k). The disadvantage of this approach is that the size of the sub-sample is
small, giving a test of low power. In addition, it is hard to aggregate the test results over
different bins.
We adopt a different procedure. Instead of considering tests based on each sub-sample,
we pool together the two groups from different sub-samples. Specifically, we aggregate the
sample points in J+(k) from all the sub-samples into one sample J+ = U'UJ+(k). Similarly,
we set J_ = U_A1J_(k). From these two samples, we estimate the distribution functions
F+ and F. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is then conducted on these two conditional
distributions. This approach has the advantage of utilizing all available data in a single test.
Table 2.5 reports the results of our test. Stock returns are generated using the following
parameters: p= 0.12, oQ= 0.15, as before, and a,/cr = /Q = 0.04. For the uninformed
manager, we consider two strategies, a passive strategy with N ' = a0 = 1, and an active
strategy that utilizes public information and sets N 0 = a0 (1 + A*Yt/oy), where a 0 = 1 and
A* = 1.803. For the informed manager, we consider her optimal strategy N1' = a, [1+A*(Yt +
Z)/ or.+ 4] with a' = 1. Since we have seen earlier that the intensity of the informed
manager's trading on private information does not affect the results of our test (as long as
A -# 0), we only consider her optimal strategy. We set m, the number of bins used to control
for public information, to 10. Sensitivity analysis presented in section 2.7.2 indicates that,
in this setup, using at least five bins does an adequate job of controlling for the common
signal. The trading records of the two managers are simulated for 800 weeks. We again run
500 simulations to obtain standard deviations of our estimates.
Summary statistics of the managers' P&L are given in Panel A of Table 2.5. Clearly,
the active strategy of the uninformed manager that uses public information can generate
a Sharpe ratio much higher than that of the passive strategy. It also generates positive
skewness and higher kurtosis. The informed manager also generates higher Sharpe ratio
than the passive strategy, and positive skewness. For the value of A that we choose for the
informed manager, she outperforms the uninformed manager's active strategy as measured
by the Sharpe ratio. But this is not a general result. If she trades less aggressively on private
information (or on public information for that matter), her Sharpe ratio can end up being
lower than that of an active but uninformed manager.
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In order to separate the managers according to their private information, we can compare
the estimated distributions F+ and F. Panel B of Table 2.5 reports the moments of these
distributions conditioned on the managers' stock position being above and below average,
controlling for the corresponding level of Y. It becomes obvious that the uninformed man-
ager's position, after controlling for Y, contains little information about future returns. The
moments of the two conditional distributions are almost identical. The situation is very
different for the informed manager. Controlling for Y, the stock return conditioned on her
position being above average has significantly higher mean than the stock return conditioned
on her position being below-average.
Panel C of Table 2.5 reports the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on F+ and F_ for
both managers. Confirming the results in panel B for the uninformed manager, we cannot
reject the null that the two conditional return distributions are the same. For the informed
manager, however, we can reject the null at the rate of 92.2% at the 1% level. Such a high
rejection rate supports the validity of our algorithm in implementing our methodology.
Of course, the particular implementation considered here needs further examination,
especially when applied in alternative information settings. We return to some of these
issues in Section 2.6.1.
2.4.4 Multiple Assets
So far, we have only considered cases where managers can invest in a single risky asset. In
this section, we show that our methodology can be easily applied to the case of multiple
assets.
We assume that managers can invest in 50 stocks. The price process for half of the stocks
is given by
Qs,t+ = -ps + Zs,t + us,t+ , s = 1,... ,25 (2.18)
while the price process for the other half is given by
Qslt+l = PS + O-S tU8t+1 , s = 26,... ,50. (2.19)
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Thus, returns for individual stocks are generated by the same processes as those considered
in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. Expected annual stock returns (As) range from 6% to 20%, while
unconditional volatility of annual returns ranges from 10% to 19%. Here, a, takes two
values, gh and a1 , with equal probability. We set oa1 = 0.07 for all stocks. The value of g
for each stock is then determined by its unconditional volatility. For simplicity, we assume
that individual price processes are mutually independent. Imposing a factor structure - for
example, adding a market factor - does not change the nature of the results.
We simulate trading records of two managers. The first manager, manager 0, is active,
but uninformed. His position in stock s is given by N' = a 0 + h,,t, where a 0 = 1 and
n8 ,,, is normal with a mean of zero and a volatility of 0.5. The second manager, manager
1, has information of varying precision about the mean and volatility of future returns of
individual stocks. For the stocks with price process given by (2.18), her position is given
by N' = a'(1 + AZ/,t/(Z,)). We set a' = 1 and A = 2. R2, the ratio of variance of the
manager's signal Z, to total variance, ranges from 0 to 5%. Thus, the manager does not have
superior information for some of the stocks, and she holds a constant number of shares in
that case. For the stocks with price process (2.19), her position is given by N 1 = p8 /(yvst).
As in Section 2.4.2, v,t = o,t + Es,t. The distribution of g8,1 is described in footnote (18).
The probability that the manager's signal about the volatility state is correct, p, ranges from
50% to 75%. As pointed out in the footnote, when the probability of correct forecast is 50%,
the manager essentially trades on noise. This represents the non-informational component of
the informed manager's trading. The varying accuracy of informed manager's signals about
future stock price movements also makes the setting more realistic.
Simulations in this section use (2.18) and (2.19) to generate monthly stock returns for 36
months. Thus, the data requirements in the multi-asset setting are similar to those used in
actual studies of mutual fund investment performance (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman (1993)) .
The reason we can significantly reduce the required number of time-series observations is
because managers' trading records for individual securities are aggregated for use in a single
test. Specifically, for each stock s, we follow the procedure described in Section 2.4.1 to
partition the sample of its monthly returns into the two subsamples, Qf and Q-, based on
the manager's position in s being above and below average. We then pool observations from
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the two subsamples across individual stocks to form Q+ = Ut Q+ and Q- = U 0Q.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is applied to the distribution functions F+ and F_ estimated
from these two samples.
The test results, based on 500 simulations, are in Table 2.6. Panel A reports the moments
of managers' P&L distributions. In addition to the two active strategies, we also show
the results for the passive strategy that holds one share of each stock. Compared to the
uninformed manager, the P&L distribution of the informed manager has higher mean and
variance, as well as larger skewness and kurtosis. Notably, the three strategies produce
almost identical Sharpe ratios. This result once again demonstrates that this performance
measure is inadequate in detecting an informed manager.
Panel B shows the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that compares conditional
distributions estimated from the Q+ and Q- samples. It is clear that our procedure can
identify both an informed and an uninformed managers. The rejection rate for the unin-
formed manager is very close to the theoretical size of the test. For the informed manager,
the null hypothesis of no information is strongly rejected. Similar results are obtained when
stock price process (2.18, 2.19) is modified to include a market factor. Thus, the analysis
in this section shows that our methodology is applicable when managers invest in multiple
risky assets.
2.5 Analysis When Positions are Unobservable
The analysis in Section 2.4 demonstrates how to identify managers with information about
asset returns under the assumption that we observe managers' asset positions. In this section,
we show how our methodology can be used when this data is not available, but instead
observations of the state variable are available ex post. Such a situation arises if we know
the state variable(s) managers claim to have information on, such as earnings or corporate
actions, and its realizations. Recall from the discussion in Section 2.3 that the trading record
of manager i in this case is given by
H =_ (G, Q, X) [0, T (G 1, Q 1, Xo), . .. ,(G , QX_) (2.20)
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where G{ is the P&L of manager i in period t, and Xt is a state variable correlated with
next-period stock return Qt+1. Rejection of the null hypothesis (2.15) about the conditional
distribution of P&L for manager i would imply that this manager has information about X.
The implementation of the test follows the algorithm described in Section 2.4.3. To
control for the variation in stock return, we partition the sample into m equal-sized bins
according to the value of Q. Within each bin, manager's P&L is scaled by the average
stock return for that bin. This makes P&L observations from different bins comparable
to one another. We then estimate the conditional distributions F' and F_ and apply the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
We apply this testing procedure in the context of the two settings considered in Sections
2.4.1 and 2.4.2, when a manager may have private information on the mean and volatility of
asset returns, respectively. We generate returns for 400 weeks by using equations (2.1) and
(2.16), respectively. The simulation is repeated 500 times. We set m, the number of bins
used to control for stock return, to 10.
Panel A of Table 2.7 shows the results for the IID/Mean case. The four strategies
considered here have been described in Section 2.4.1. As a reminder, stock returns in this
setup are generated by Qt+l = it + Zt + ut+i, and the informed manager observes Z before
deciding how much of her portfolio to invest in the stock. Because we do not have access to
managers' positions, it is no longer possible to identify the manager who follows a passive
buy-and-hold strategy without doing the actual test. However, the test clearly reveals that
the uninformed manager has no information about Z, whether he follows a passive or an
active strategy. The test also correctly identifies the informed manager; the rejection rate
of the null hypothesis that this manager is uninformed is 100% both at the 1% and the 5%
confidence level. Moreover, test results do not depend on manager's trading intensity: test
statistics when A = A* are almost identical to those when A = 5A*.
Panel B of Table 2.7 shows the results for the IID/Volatility case. Again, the trading
strategies of the informed and uninformed managers considered here are the same as the
ones analyzed in Section 2.4.2. In this setting, stock returns are given by Qt+1 = p+t ut+,
and the informed manager gets a signal about cr. The test results show that the uninformed
manager has no information about the volatility of the stock return, regardless of the strategy
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he follows. For the informed manager, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected even when
her signal about volatility contains noise. The rejection rate for both partially- and fully-
informed strategies is 100%. Not surprisingly, the average value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic is higher when the manager's signal is more precise.
2.6 Additional Applications
In this section, we show how our approach works in the context of two additional settings.
In Section 2.6.1, we apply our methodology to a situation where both managers might have
private information about future stock return. After that, we examine the case where a
manager can trade in-between the times at which we observe his positions.
2.6.1 Differential Information
Suppose that both managers might have private information about future returns. A natural
question we face is whether one of the managers has information in addition to that of the
other manager. For example, knowing that manager 0 has information about future returns,
can we tell if another manager, manager 1, has information that is different from or superior
to that of manager 0? In this subsection, we consider an example that illustrates how our
methodology can be used to answer this question.
As in Section 2.4.3, we assume that stock returns follow the process:
Qt+1 = P + Yt + Z + Ut+1 (2.21)
where g is a positive constant, Y, Zt and ut+1 are independent normal, IID over time, with
zero mean and volatility o-y, zo-, and o, respectively. Before deciding how much to invest in
the risky asset at time t, both managers receive signals, St, and St, respectively, that contain
information about Z, and/or Yt. The three cases we consider differ in the types of signals
the two managers receive:
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Scenario 1: S/ = Zt, KSo = Y
Scenario2: SJ =Yt, S = Yt + e?
Scenario 3: SJ = Yt + eI, S = Y + e
where el and e? are two independent white noise sequences with a2 = Or = 2o4. Thus, the
first scenario describes a situation when the private information sets of the two managers
are disjoint. The second scenario corresponds to a setting in which both managers receive a
signal about the same "event", but the signal of one of the managers is more precise than
the signal of the other manager. The last scenario is similar to the second one, except that
now the two managers receive equally precise signals.
The implementation of our approach in this context is similar to that described in Section
2.4.3. Instead of controlling for public information Y, we need to control for the position of
one of the managers, say manager 0, No. Under the null hypothesis that the second manager
(manager 1 in this case) does not have any additional information, we must have
FA( - N)=FA(-NO) V A, A' andNo (2.22)
where Fs(xlNO) = F(Qt alNk_1 £ S, Nt_ 1 = NO) is the cumulative distribution of stock
dollar return conditioned on the stock position of manager 0 being N$o_ 1 = No and the stock
position of manager 1 being in the set S = A, A'. Given the trading records of the two
managers (Q, N1 , NO)[o,T], we partition the sample into m equal-sized bins according to the
value of No. We then proceed to estimate the conditional distributions F+ and F_ as in
the non-IID case, and apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to these estimated distributions.
By interchanging the positions of the two managers in (2.22) and repeating this procedure,
we can test whether manager 0 has information beyond that of manager 1. Notice that if a
manager's position is linear in her signal, controlling for her position gives exactly the same
results as controlling for the value of the signal itself. If her position is non-linear in the
signal, our (unreported) results indicate that this method of controlling for her information
is still valid, provided that we use enough bins. The only requirement is that the manager's
stock position is monotone in her signal.
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For the tests discussed in this section, we assume that the managers' stock position is
linear in their signal: Nt = a(jl + ASJo(SI)), i =0,1. We set a0 = al = 1, A = 1.803, and
m, the number of bins, to 10. We use (2.21) to simulate managers' trading records for 800
weeks, and repeat the simulation 500 times.
Test results for the three scenarios are presented in panels A, B, and C, respectively,
of Table 2.8. In the first case, the results in panel A indicate that observing positions of
both managers is informative. That is, no matter which manager's position we observe first,
knowing the position of the other manager provides additional information about future
stock returns. This is not surprising, given that the two managers receive independent,
equally precise signals about the expected stock return. Since the signals are uncorrelated,
both signals are valuable, and the order of conditioning does not matter.
In the second scenario, manager 1 receives a more precise signal. Therefore, observing
his position is informative even if we already know the position of manager 0. The reverse,
however, is not true. Results in panel B show that the test correctly distinguishes between
the two managers. Controlling for manager l's position, we cannot reject the null that
manager 0 has no additional information. In contrast, the test strongly rejects the null that
manager l's position is uninformative once we know the position of manager 0. The rejection
rate is 78% at the 1% level and 92.4% at the 5% level.
In the last scenario we consider, the signals of both managers contain noise. Because the
noise components are uncorrelated, observing positions of both managers is more informative
than only knowing the position of one of them. The incremental benefit, however, is smaller
than in the first scenario. The results in panel C confirm this intuition. The rejection rates
are similar for the two managers and are much lower than for the first scenario.
2.6.2 Dynamic Strategies
In the discussion of Section 2.4, we have assumed that we observe the managers' complete
trading records, including the times of their trades and their positions at those times. Often,
however, we only have a manager's trading record at a given time interval, which is longer
than the interval at which he can trade. Revealing records only infrequently gives the unin-
formed manager more room to find strategies that look profitable. In particular, following
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option-like strategies, he can generate very high Sharpe ratios in the absence of any private
information on future returns. Of course, as discussed earlier, the Sharpe ratio is not an
appropriate measure of performance for option-type strategies since they can produce return
distributions that are far from normal.
Thus, we examine how our methodology works when applied to option-type strategies.
Specifically, we consider the following two strategies. The first strategy consists of holding
a portfolio of three put options in the proportion of -1000:1000:-8. This position resembles
long put spread; the ratio is chosen so that higher moments of the strategy's P&L are
similar to those of other strategies. When the position is initiated, all three puts have three
weeks to maturity and strikes that are $0.30, $0.28, and $0.26 below the current stock price,
respectively. The position is rolled over one week before the options mature. The second
strategy involves rolling over a short position in a deep out-of-the-money call option on the
stock. When the position is initiated, the call has 12 weeks to maturity and a strike price
$1.24 above the current stock price. Again, the position is rolled over one week before the
option expires. We use results in Brennan (1979) to price options under normality. For
both option strategies, the positions are scaled so that mean and standard deviation of P&L
are comparable to those produced by cash-and-stock strategies. The option strategies can
be interpreted as a proxy for an uninformed manager who dynamically adjusts his position
between observation times.
Weekly stock price increments are generated by simulating (2.1) for 400 weeks, using
the same parameter values as in Section 2.4.1. Simulation is repeated 500 times to obtain
standard deviations of our estimates. Stock price is initialized to $1 at the beginning of each
simulation.
Panel A of Table 2.9 reports the summary statistics for the two option strategies. For
comparison, we have also included the summary of the P&L of an uninformed manager who
follows a passive strategy, and of an informed manager who trades actively on her private
information. Clearly, the option-type strategies can generate very large Sharpe ratios. The
put strategy gives a Sharpe ratio of 0.844, significantly higher than that of the informed
manager. The Sharpe ratio of the call strategy (0.284) also exceeds that of the informed
manager. In addition, the call strategy P&L has large positive skewness, a characteristic
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shared by the informed manager's P&L. In this situation, comparing the unconditional
distributions of managers' P&L fails to distinguish an informed manager from an uninformed
one. As we pointed out before, this is one of the main reasons our methodology relies on
conditional distributions of stock returns.
Suppose that we do not have the complete information on the trading record of the
uninformed manager who follows an option-type strategy. For example, if the manager is
dynamically implementing the strategy of rolling over a short position in calls, we may not
be able to identify his strategy based only on his weekly trading record. However, if he has
to report the delta of his position on a weekly basis, then our approach can be applied to
evaluate him.
Panel B of Table 2.9 reports the moments of stock dollar return conditioned on the
manager's delta being above (N > N) and below (N < N) its average. The results indicate
that there is practically no difference between the two sets of conditional moments. This is
not surprising given that the manager has no information about future returns. His current
position is only related to past stock price movements, but not to future ones.
Panel C of Table 2.9 gives the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Clearly, we cannot
reject the null that conditioned on different delta's of the uninformed manager, the return
distributions are the same. Thus, the results in Table 2.9 confirm that while option-type
strategies can generate high Sharpe ratios, our methodology correctly detects that these
strategies contain no information about future stock returns.
2.7 Robustness
In this section, we discuss several additional issues regarding our methodology. In Section
2.7.1, we show how the precision of manager's private signal and the length of her trading
record affect the power of our approach to identify the informed manager when she invests
in a single risky asset. Section 2.7.2 presents results on choosing the number of bins used to
control for common information.
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2.7.1 Sample Size and Power of the Test
Up to this point, we have focused on developing a methodology to detect an informed
manager assuming that we have enough observations to do so. In particular, for the cases
where returns are IID to the uninformed investors, we have used a 400-week sample, which
roughly corresponds to eight years of data. We have used a sample twice as long when
less informed investors have information that makes returns non-IID from their perspective.
Whether or not this is a reasonable assumption depends on the application at hand. For
example, mutual fund holdings data is only available quarterly, meaning that a portfolio
manager would have to have an unusually long career before we can collect a sample of 400
observations. On the other hand, a supervisor at an investment bank trying to assess the
performance of a trading desk has access to traders' positions at least at a daily frequency,
making our data availability assumptions more realistic. Another factor that affects the
power of our tests is the amount of information reflected in a manager's trading strategy.
Obviously, the better informed a manager is, the easier it is to identify his strategy as being
informative.
In the IID setting of Section 2.4.1, Table 2.10 provides sensitivity results for our testing
methodology with respect to the precision of manager's information and the available sample
size. For three values of R2, 5%, 2%, and 1%, we report the results of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test applied to the conditional distributions F+ and F_ estimated when the number
of observations per simulation, T, ranges from 50 to 400. When R2 = 5%, the rejection
rate remains quite high, 35% at the 5% level, even when the sample size is reduced to 100
observations. As R2 decreases, we need more data points to reliably identify the informed
manager. For example, when R2 = 1%, the rejection rate at the 5% level is 31.8% for 400
observations, but drops to 17.4% when we use 200 observations. Overall, the results indicate
that the test remains useful even when the sample size is reduced and when the manager's
information is less precise.
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2.7.2 Choosing Number of Bins to Control for Common Informa-
tion
In Section 2.4.3, we develop a procedure to detect incremental information provided by
a manager relative to some common information set. The procedure involves allocating
available observations to bins (sub-samples) formed according to the value of the common
signal (call it Y). Ideally, we would like Y to be constant within each sub-sample, but this
is not possible when Y is a continuous random variable and we have a limited amount of
data. The idea behind our approach is to limit variation of Y within each sub-sample. Then,
in each sub-sample, most of the variation in manager's position must be caused by other
signal, whether it is informative or not. This suggests using as many bins as possible, up to
a maximum of T/2.19 However, it might be interesting to see how many bins are sufficient
to control for the common signal.
In the non-IID setting of Section 2.4.3, we show what happens to our test results as the
number of bins used to control for the public signal Y increases from two to 100. Since
we might not know a priori who the more informed manager is, we do two sets of tests:
controlling for manager 0's position, and controlling for manager l's position, similar to the
differential information tests discussed in Section 2.6.1. Table 2.11 contains the results of
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test applied to F+ and 1<. For comparison, we show the results
for T = 800 (panel A), and for T = 400 (panel B). Apparently, using five or more bins to
condition on manager l's position is sufficient to conclude that manager 0 has no information
beyond that of manager 1. If we use two bins, the variation of Y in each sub-sample is large
enough to cause significant differences between the two estimated conditional distributions at
least some of the time. Controlling for manager 0's position (which in this case is equivalent to
controlling for Y directly), the test correctly detects that manager l's position is informative.
The rejection rate declines somewhat as we increase the number of bins, especially when we
only have 400 observations. There is a simple explanation for this effect. When we use few
bins, both the variation in X and the residual variation in Y contribute to the difference
between F+ and F_. As we use more bins, the residual variation in Y diminishes, leaving
19Since we compute F+(k) and F_.(k) for each sub-sample k, we need to have at least two observations in
each bin.
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X as the only source of difference between F+ and F_ and reducing the observed rejection
rates. Not surprisingly, this effect is more pronounced for smaller samples.
2.8 Conclusion
It has been recognized for a long time that traditional performance evaluation methods for
money managers have numerous drawbacks. Risk-based framework relies on a specific risk
model. Because the risk of an asset typically depends on an investor's information set, any
risk model an evaluator uses based on an information set different from that of the manager's
will be mis-specified in general. To the extent that the value of a manager comes from the
additional information she may bring into the investment process, the first step in evaluating
a manager is to determine if she possesses private information. In this paper, we develop a
general methodology to identify managers with information on future asset returns based on
their trading records. Our methodology does not rely on a specific risk model, such as the
Sharpe ratio, CAPM, or APT. It is robust with regard to the nature of private information
the managers may have and the trading strategies they follow.
As mentioned in the introduction, our methodology also has limitations. First, it can
identify informed managers, but does not assess the value of a manager to a particular
investor. Second, the non-parametric nature of the methodology allows it to detect any
information a manager may have about future asset returns. The drawback is that it does
not tell us what this information is about. Further analysis is needed to answer this question.
Third, the implementation of the methodology requires data on the managers' trading records
in addition to their P&L. In the two cases we considered, one requires information on the
managers' positions and the other requires information regarding the events on which they
are betting. Moreover, the amount of data needed can be quite substantial in order for the
test to have power. For some applications, such as internal evaluation of a trading desk
or the evaluation of a hedge fund by its investors, the data required is available. But for
other applications, such as the evaluation of mutual funds, the data can be hard to come by.
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Table 2.1: Moments of managers' P&L and stock dollar return. Panel A shows weekly P&L moments
for the uninformed an informed managers' strategies. The uninformed manager's stock position is Nt = a0
(i.e. he follows a passive strategy). The informed manager's stock position is N = a1 (1 + AZ/u-), where
A, her trading intensity, takes on one of two values: A = A* or A = 5A*. Panel B shows unconditional and
conditional moments of weekly stock dollar return, demeaned by the unconditional mean. We condition on
the informed manager's stock position being above (N > N) and below (N <; N) its average. Stock dollar
return is given by Qt+i = p + Zt + ut+1. Parameter values are: p = 0.12 (annual), o-, = 0.15 (annual),
o2l/o = 0.01, a0 = a'1 = 1, A* = 0.901.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for weekly managers' P&L and stock return (IID/Mean case). Panel A shows moments of the uninformed an
informed managers' P&L. We consider two strategies for the uninformed manager: passive (Nt = a0 ), and active with noise (N = a0 + it). Th
informed manager's stock position is Nz = a'(1 + AZ/o-z), where A, her trading intensity, takes on one of two values: A = A*, or A = 5A*. Panel
shows moments of stock dollar return conditioned on active managers' stock position being above (N > N) and below (N < N) its average. Sto
dollar return is given by Qt+I = p+ Z + ut+ 1. Parameter values are: p = 0.12 (annual), o,= 0.15 (annual), a2/-g = 0.05, a0 =a 1, A* 2.01
a= 0.5. Average moments and the corresponding standard deviations (shown in parentheses) are based on 500 simulations.
A. Moments of Managers' P&L
Uninformed Informed
Passive Active A A* A 5A*
Mean (%) 0.231 0.234 1.176 4.964
(0.105) (0.115) (0.247) (1.074)
S.D. (%) 2.084 2.331 4.842 21.635
(0.076) (0.119) (0.354) (1.725)
Skewness 0.003 0.114 1.280 1.250
(0.123) (0.313) (0.550) (0.570)
Kurtosis 2.997 5.038 9.262 9.236
(0.247) (1.138) (3.470) (3.473)
Sharpe Ratio 0.111 0.101 0.242 0.229
(0.051) (0.049) (0.046) (0.045)
B. Moments of Stock Dollar Return
Unconditional Conditional
Uninformed A = A* A = 5A*
N>N N<N N>N N<N N>N N<N
Mean (%) 0.231 0.237 0.225 0.604 -0.141 0.604 -0.132
(0.105) (0.148) (0.149) (0.151) (0.150) (0.142) (0.152)
S.D. (%) 2.084 2.082 2.084 2.049 2.050 2.035 2.051
(0.076) (0.104) (0.107) (0.105) (0.099) (0.110) (0.101)
Skewness 0.003 -0.008 0.015 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.007
(0.123) (0.172) (0.173) (0.172) (0.168) (0.180) (0.168)
Kurtosis 2.997 2.987 2.980 2.994 2.979 2.997 2.976






Table 2.3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results for the conditional distribution of stock dollar return
(IID/Mean case). We estimate cumulative distribution of weekly stock return conditioned on manager's
stock position being above average (F+) and below average (F-). We also estimate the unconditional cumu-
lative distribution of weekly stock return (F). We then apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to three pairs of
distributions: F+ versus F, F_ versus F, and F+ versus F. The average Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic,
6, its standard deviation (shown in parentheses), and the rejection rates at the 1% and 5% level are based
on 500 simulations. The uninformed manager's stock position is NT = a0 + 5t. The informed manager's
stock position is Nt = al(1 + AZt/a 3 ), where A, her trading intensity, takes on one of two values: A = A*,
or A = 5A*. Stock dollar return is given by Qt+1 = p + Zt + ut+1. Parameter values are: y = 0.12 (annual),
Q= 0.15 (annual), a 2 /a2 = 0.05, a0 = a' = 1, A* = 2.016, ai = 0.5.
F+ vs. F F- vs. F F+ vs. F-
Uninformed
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6 0.51 0.51 0.87
(0.15) (0.15) (0.25)
Rejection Rate at 1% (%) 0.00 0.00 0.80
Rejection Rate at 5% (%) 0.00 0.00 4.00
Informed
A = A*
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6 1.08 1.08 1.87
(0.25) (0.26) (0.44)
Rejection Rate at 1% (%) 2.00 2.20 70.20
Rejection Rate at 5% (%) 15.60 15.80 87.40
A = 5A*
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6 1.08 1.08 1.86
(0.25) (0.25) (0.43)
Rejection Rate at 1% (%) 2.60 1.60 68.60
Rejection Rate at 5% (%) 13.40 14.40 88.00
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results for the IID/Volatility case. Panel A
shows summary statistics for weekly P&L of the uninformed and informed managers. The two strategies of
the uninformed manager are passive (N = a0), and active with noise (Nt = p/[y(rt + aot) 23). The informed
manager is either fully informed, with Nt = p/(yo?), or partially informed, with Nt = p/[y(ct + Jit) 2
Panel B shows moments of weekly stock dollar return conditioned on active managers' stock position being
above (N > N) and below (N <; N) its average. Panel C shows results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on
the distributions of weekly stock dollar return conditioned on active managers' stock position being above
average (F+) and below average (F_). Stock dollar return is given by Qt+1 = I + Utut+i. Here, ot is either
0.20 or 0.07, with equal probability, and 5t can be Ou - a, 0, or Ch - 0i with probabilities 0.5(1 - p), p,
and 0.5(1 - p), respectively, where po = 0.5, p1 = 0.75. Other parameter values are: yj= 0.12 (annual),
a9 = 0.15 (annual), -y = 51, a0 = 1. Average statistics, standard deviations (shown in parentheses), and the
rejection rates at the 1% and 5% level are based on 500 simulations.































































2.076 2.090 2.057 1.619 2.445
(0.098) (0.143) (0.137) (0.135) (0.137)
-0.023 -0.044 0.000 -0.042 -0.010
(0.223) (0.307) (0.320) (0.526) (0.216)
4.721 4.653 4.666 6.244 3.624











C. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test On Conditional Stock Dollar Return Distributions
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results for the non-IID case. Panel A shows
weekly P&L moments for the uninformed and informed managers' strategies. We consider two strategies for
the uninformed manager: passive (Nt = a0), and active (N - a 0(1 + A*Yt/,)). The informed manager's
stock position is N, = a1 [1 ± A*(Y,, ± Z,,)/ a + a j. Panel B shows moments of weekly stock dollar
return conditioned on active managers' stock position being above (N > N) and below (N < N) its
average. For comparison, we also provide moments of the unconditional weekly stock returns. Panel C
shows results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the distributions of weekly stock dollar return conditioned
on active managers' stock position being above average (F+) and below average (F.). Stock dollar return
is given by Qt+i = + Yt + Z + ut+, 1. Parameter values are: /t = 0.12 (annual), cor= 0.15 (annual),
Ol/o Z= / = 0.04, a 0 = a' = 1, A* = 1.803. Average statistics, standard deviations (shown in
parentheses), and the rejection rates at the 1% and 5% level are based on 500 simulations.
A. Summary Statistics of Managers' P&L
Uninformed Informed
Passive Active (A=A*)
Mean (%) 0.230 0.982 1.294
(0.074) (0.155) (0.164)





Kurtosis 2.994 9.225 9.691
(0.166) (2.481) (2.937)
Sharpe Ratio 0.110 0.222 0.288
(0.036) (0.033) (0.031)
B. Moments of Conditional Stock Dollar Return
Unconditional Conditional
Uninformed Informed
N>NR N<;N N>NR N<N
Mean (%) 0.230 0.247 0.213 0.564 -0.104
(0.074) (0.100) (0.109) (0.103) (0.106)
S.D. (%) 2.084 2.081 2.086 2.052 2.062
(0.052) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.070)
Skewness 
-0.003 0.001 -0.007 0.004 -0.005
(0.087) (0.123) (0.115) (0.115) (0.125)
Kurtosis 2.994 2.988 2.984 2.982 2.983
(0.166) (0.240) (0.240) (0.250) (0.231)
C. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test on Conditional Stock Dollar Return Distributions
Uninformed Informed
P+ vs. F.+ vs. F_
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6 0.88 2.21
(0.26) (0.41)
Rejection Rate at 1% (%) 0.60 92.20
Rejection Rate at 5% (%) 5.80 98.80
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Table 2.6: Summary statistics and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results for the Multiple Assets case. Panel A
shows summary statistics for monthly P&L of the uninformed and informed managers. Managers invest in 50
stocks. Monthly returns for the first 25 stocks are generated by Qs,t+ P= s + Z5,t + us,t+1- Monthly returns
for the remaining 25 stocks are generated by Qs,t+i = p + o-,t s,t+1. Expected annual stock returns (AS)
range from 6 to 20 percent. Unconditional volatility of annual returns ranges from 10 to 19 percent. Passive
uninformed manager holds one share of each stock. The position of active uninformed manager in stock s is
given by N2o = a0 + 5 ,t, where a0 = 1 and i,,t is normal with a mean of zero and a volatility of 50%. The
position of the informed manager in any of the first 25 stocks is given by NJt a'(1 + AZ,t/o(Z,)). Here,
al = 1, A - 2, and R2, the ratio of variance of the manager's signal Z, to total variance, ranges between
0 and 5 percent. Her position in the remaining 25 stocks is given by N = p8 /(7v 5 ,i). Here, y = 51 and
VS,, = o-5 ,t + ESt. See footnote (18) and Table 2.4 for the description of V,,t. p, the probability that the
manager's signal about the volatility state is correct, ranges from 50 to 75 percent. Panel B shows the results
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The average Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for the comparison of F+
vs. F_, 6, its standard deviation (shown in parentheses), and the rejection rates at the 1% and 5% level
are based on 500 simulations.







































B. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test on Conditional Stock Dollar Return Distributions
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6
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Table 2.7: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results for the conditional distribution of manager's P&L when man-
agers' positions are unobservable. After controlling for the observed stock return, we estimate the cumulative
distribution of manager's weekly P&L conditioned on the realized value of a state variable being above av-
erage (F1) and below average (F). We use 10 bins to control for the variation in stock return. Panel A
shows the results for the IID/Mean case. Stock returns are generated by Qt+1 = M + Zt + ut+1. The state
variable is Zt. See Tables 2.2 and 2.3 for the description of managers' strategies and parameter values. Panel
B shows the results for the IID/Volatility case. Stock returns are generated by Qt+i = p +-tut+1. The state
variable is a-. See Table 2.4 for the description of managers' strategies and parameter values. The average
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for the comparison of F+f vs. FZ, 6, its standard deviation (shown in
parentheses), and the rejection rates at the 1% and 5% level are based on 500 simulations.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6
Rejection rate at 1% (%)
Rejection rate at 5% (%)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6
Rejection rate at 1% (%)








































Table 2.8: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results for the conditional distribution of stock dollar return when
both managers have private information. After controlling for stock position of one of the two managers,
we estimate the cumulative distribution of weekly stock return conditioned on the second manager's stock
position being above average (F+) and below average (F_). Panels A, B, and C show the results of applying
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to F+ and F_ in three different information settings. In panel A, stock
positions of managers 0 and 1 are given by N? = a0(1 + AYt/oy), NJ = a'(1 + AZt/c-z). In panel B, stock
positions of managers 0 and 1 are given by N? = a0[1+ A(Yt + e7)/ cr e o-j, NJ = a(1+ AYt/oy).
In panel C, stock positions of managers 0 and 1 are given by N0 = a0 [1 + A(Yt + et)/I/oj + O-uO ], NJ=
a' [1 + A(Y + eI)/ 4+o-j. Stock dollar return is given by Qt+1 = + Yt + Zt + ut+. Parameter
values are: p 0.12 (annual), o = 0.15 (annual), a2./0-2 = U2/ag - 0.04, a0 = a'1 = 1, A = 1.803.
Here, el and e? are two independent white noise sequences with a- 2 = 0 - = 2o4. Average test statistics,
standard deviations (shown in parentheses), and the rejection rates at the 1% and 5% level are based on 500
simulations.
A. Manager 0 observes Y, Manager 1 observes Z
Kolmogorov-Smirnov S
Rejection rate at 1% (%)
Rejection rate at 5% (%)
First Controlling for





B. Manager 0 observes Y with noise, Manager 1 observes Y
Kolmogorov-Smirnov J
Rejection rate at 1% (%)
Rejection rate at 5% (%)
First Controlling for





C. Manager 0 observes Y with noise, Manager 1 observes Y with noise
First Controlling for
Manager l's Position Manager O's position
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6
Rejection rate at 1% (%)










Table 2.9: Summary statistics and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results for the Incomplete Trading Records
case. Panel A shows weekly P&L moments for the option and non-option strategies. The two non-option
strategies are the uninformed manager's passive strategy (N = a0 ), and the informed manager's active
strategy (Nt = al(1 + A*Zt/crz)). The first option strategy consists of holding a portfolio of three 3-week
puts in proportion of -1000:1000:-8. The respective strikes are set $0.30, $0.28, and $0.26 below the current
stock price. The position is rolled over one week before the options mature. The second option strategy
involves shorting a 12-week call with a strike $1.24 above the current stock price, and rolling over the short
position one week before the option expires. The implied stock position for both strategies is obtained by
computing the positions' delta. Panel B shows moments of weekly stock dollar return conditioned on active
managers' stock position being above (N > N) and below (N N) its average. Panel C shows results
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the distributions of weekly stock dollar return conditioned on active
managers' stock position being above average (F+) and below average (F_). Stock dollar return is given
by Qt+1 = p + Z + ut+1. Parameter values are: p = 0.12 (annual), o0 = 0.15 (annual), c4/O- = 0.05,
a0 = al = 1, * 2.016. Average statistics, standard deviations (shown in parentheses), and the rejection
rates at the 1% and 5% level are based on 500 simulations.



















































































C. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test on Conditional Stock Dollar Return Distributions
Informed Put Strategy Call Strategy
F+ vs. F-_ F+ vs. F- F+ vs. K.
K.-S. 6 1.87 0.89 0.88
(0.44) (0.27) (0.25)
Rej. Rate at 1% (%) 70.20 1.80 0.60














Table 2.10: Sensitivity of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results (IID/Mean case). We estimate the sensi-
tivity of rejection rates of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with respect to the precision of informed manager's
information (as measured by R2 ) and to the length of her trading record (T) available. The test is ap-
plied to the distributions of weekly stock dollar return conditioned on the manager's stock position being
above average (F+) and below average (F_). The average Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, J, its stan-
dard deviation (shown in parentheses), and the rejection rates at the 1% and 5% level are based on 500
simulations. The informed manager's stock position is N = al(1 + AZt/c-z). Stock dollar return is given
by Qt+1 = iL + Zt + ut+1. Parameter values are: t = 0.12 (annual), o0 = 0.15 (annual), a'1 = 1, A = 2.016.
R U2 -- /U2 is 5% in panel A, 2% in panel B, and 1% in panel C.
A. R 2 =5%
T = 400 T = 200
F+ vs. F -+ vs. F_.
T = 100 T= 50
F+ vs. F + vs. F
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6
Rejection rate at 1% (%)
Rejection rate at 5% (%)
T = 400 T = 200
F+ vs. F- F+ vs. F_
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6
Rejection rate at 1% (%)
Rejection rate at 5% (%)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 5
Rejection rate at 1% (%)
































































Table 2.11: Sensitivity of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results (non-IID case). We estimate the sensitivity
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with respect to the number of bins used to control for the information of one
of the two managers. The test is applied to the distributions of weekly stock dollar return conditioned on
the second manager's stock position being above average (F+) and below average (F_), after controlling for
the position of the first manager. The average Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, 6, its standard deviation
(shown in parentheses), and the rejection rates at the 1% and 5% level are based on 500 simulations. We
assume that the trading record available is either 800 observations (panel A), or 400 observations (panel B).
Stock positions of managers 0 and 1 are given by Nt0 - ao (1+A*Yt/o-y), N1 = a' [1+A*(Yt+Zt)/ /o4 + a2 ].
Stock dollar return is given by Qt+i = L+Yt+Z+ut+1. Parameter values are: p= 0.12 (annual), cr0 = 0.15
(annual), a$2/a- = U2/0-2= 0.04, a0 = a' = 1, A* = 1.803.
A. T = 800
First Conditioning on:
Kolmogorov-Smirnov S
Rejection rate at 1% (%)
Rejection rate at 5% (%)
# Bins = 100
Mgr 1 Mgr0
# Bins = 50 # Bins = 10
Mgr I Mgr 0 Mgr I Mgr0
0.87 2.13 0.88 2.17 0.86
(0.27) (0.43) (0.26) (0.43) (0.26)
1.40 87.60 1.40 90.00 0.80

























B. T = 400
First Conditioning on:
Kolmogorov-Smirnov S4
Rejection rate at 1% (%)
Rejection rate at 5% (%)






# Bins = 50 # Bins = 10








































Welfare Implications of Market
Transparency
3.1 Introduction
The lack of market transparency has been identified as one of the key reasons behind the
crisis of the global financial system in the fall of 1998. The informational failure has occurred
on two levels. First, inadequate disclosure between relative-value arbitrageurs and their
lenders resulted in underestimation of counterparty risk profile and permitted excessive use
of leverage. Second, the lack of information on aggregate exposures made many market
participants to underestimate the potential liquidity impact of their trades and exacerbated
the liquidity crunch when similar positions had to be liquidated within a relatively short
period of time. The first issue, that of private disclosure between two counterparties, is
addressed in Ko (2002). In this paper, I concentrate on the second type of information,
public disclosure of aggregate market variables.
I consider a three-period financial market economy with two types of agents, risk-averse
investors and risk-neutral market makers. Investors receive a risky endowment stream, giving
them a hedging motive to trade with the market makers. Market makers face a financial
constraint that prevents them from completely absorbing investors' endowment risk. In
addition to the fundamental risk associated with investors' endowments, I introduce liquidity
risk in the model by making their demand for liquidity in the intermediate period uncertain.
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In the transparent equilibrium, this uncertainty is resolved before the start of trading in the
initial period. In the non-transparent equilibrium, investors' liquidity shock is unknown until
the intermediate period. I compare agents' welfare under the two equilibria, and analyze
whether market makers positions are socially optimal.
Similarly to Grossman and Miller (1988), there is no private information in the model,
and the role of the market makers is to provide liquidity service to the investors. Being less
risk-averse, they are willing to bear the endowment risk that more risk-averse investors would
rather avoid. This is consistent with the intermediation role that relative-value arbitrageurs
played in the late 1990's. Arbitrageurs' activities allowed other market participants to adjust
their positions and risk exposures according to their preferences.1
The market makers' financial constraint captures the notion, first formalized in Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), that arbitrageurs' access to outside capital is restricted. Given that
the ability to withstand temporary losses without having to liquidate positions is crucial for
implementing relative-value strategies, the information about aggregate available market-
making capacity becomes an important input into an individual arbitrageur's risk manage-
ment process. In fact, in describing LTCM's trading strategies, Perold states that "important
to LTCM's assessment of risk was the belief that as pricing discrepancies became more pro-
nounced, trades based on these discrepancies would attract more capital from arbitrageurs
and other investors ...".
The Bank of International Settlements [BIS] review of financial market events in the fall of
1998 (BIS (1999)) finds that "... market participants in the main may have misestimated the
amount of capital actually devoted to keeping spreads tight across a variety of markets ...
1The relative-value, or convergence, arbitrage trading strategies, made prominent by the early successes
of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund (LTCM), frequently involve taking offsetting positions
in assets that have somewhat different characteristics. The arbitrageur then makes an informed judgement
on whether the price differential between the two assets adequately reflects this difference in characteristics.
For example, one of the LTCM's often described strategies involved shorting a more liquid on-the-run 30-
year U.S. Treasury bond and establishing an offsetting position in the less liquid off-the-run bond of slightly
shorter maturity. In another trade, LTCM provided insurance against large swings in the U.S. and European
equity indices to its counterparties by selling long-dated put and call options to them. See Dunbar (2000),
Edwards (1999), Lewis (1999), and Perold (1999) for a description of LTCM, its founders, and its trading
strategies.
2 Several recent papers show how various market frictions, such as position limits, margin requirements,
and wealth constraints, make apparent arbitrage opportunities sustainable in a financial market equilibrium.
These papers include Basak and Croitoru (2000), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Liu and Longstaff (2001),
Loewenstein and Willard (2000a, 2000b, 2001).
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In other words, the misperception of the total amount of capital available to absorb liquidity
shocks was an important mechanism in causing the crisis. This realization naturally led to
recommendations for greater transparency about aggregate exposures of market participants
(BIS (1999, 2000)). In the model, the uncertainty about aggregate market variables is
represented by the stochastic liquidity demand of investors in the intermediate period. In
the transparent equilibrium, this uncertainty is resolved before the start of trading, while in
the non-transparent equilibrium it is resolved in the course of trading in the intermediate
period. Comparison of the agents' welfare in the two equilibria has implications for the social
desirability of market transparency.
The transparent equilibrium provides for better sharing of endowment risk. However,
it eliminates the possibility of sharing liquidity risk because the uncertainty gets resolved
before trading begins. This can potentially make the agents worse off, as first pointed out
in Hirshleifer (1971) .3 On the other hand, in the non-transparent equilibrium there is an
opportunity to share both fundamental and liquidity risks, but the market makers may
behave in a more risk-averse way because of the added uncertainty about investors' liquidity
shock.
The financial constraint faced by the market makers can take one of two forms. They
either cannot borrow (Borrowing Constraint), or their wealth has to be non-negative at
all times (Wealth Constraint). As we will see, the first constraint is more restrictive than
the second one. For a given type of constraint, I solve the model numerically to obtain
agents' ex-ante expected utility under the transparent and non-transparent equilibrium. I
then compare agents' welfare under the two equilibria.
The non-transparent equilibrium never leads to Pareto improvement. For the Wealth
Constraint, the transparent equilibrium is Pareto optimal when the aggregate wealth of the
market-makers is relatively low. When their aggregate wealth is relatively high, transparency
benefits investors at the expense of the market makers. The results for the Borrowing
Constraint case are similar, except for the very low levels of market makers' aggregate wealth.
In that situation, investors are worse off under the transparent equilibrium.
I then consider whether the level of liquidity provided by the market makers is socially
'This idea is further developed in Dow (1998), Dow and Rahi (2000, 2001), and Marin and Rahi (2000).
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optimal. To do that, I perturb the equilibrium position of a market maker by a small
amount, compute agents' expected utility in the resulting equilibrium, and compare it to their
expected utility in the unperturbed equilibrium. It turns out that small exogenous changes
in market makers' positions are not Pareto improving. In contrast, Gromb and Vayanos
(2002) consider a model with segmented markets and financially constrained arbitrageurs
and find that arbitrageurs may take on too much or too little risk. Their result depends on
the redistribution of wealth both across time and across states of nature. When the number
of time periods in their setting is small, the arbitrageurs' equilibrium positions are no longer
suboptimal.
Finally, I examine how the volatility of the liquidity shock affects the comparison between
transparent and non-transparent equilibrium. I find that the differences between the two
equilibria are more pronounced for the higher level of volatility. Given that uncertainty about
liquidity shock increases market makers' risk aversion and drives the differences between the
two equilibria, this result is not surprising.
Several recent papers have focused on various features of the financial market events that
occurred in the fall of 1998. Ko (2002) studies the disclosure by privately informed arbi-
trageurs to their lenders in a setting where both agent types have heterogeneous risk expo-
sures. The possibility of front-running by lending institutions precludes voluntary disclosure
when arbitrageurs' investment opportunity is sufficiently profitable. Mandatory disclosure
may result in better risk allocation, but may also lead to concentrations of risk. Xiong
(2001) studies a model in which convergence traders with logarithmic utility absorb liquidity
shocks. He finds that when these traders' wealth drops significantly, their trading amplifies
price volatility and reduces market liquidity. In a similar setting, but with two risky assets,
Kyle and Xiong (2001) show how the reduction in wealth of financial intermediaries can
induce correlation among assets with independent fundamentals. Schinasi and Smith (1999)
use partial-equilibrium analysis to argue that a combination of leverage and common portfo-
lio management rules can produce contagion. Morris and Shin (2000) focus on externalities
imposed by risk management activities of individual traders on others with similar positions.
This issue is also addressed in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and in the BIS reports.
Another strand of literature has considered the aspects of market transparency related
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to the information about the trading process (see O'Hara (1995) for a review). The quali-
tative conclusions of my analysis are most similar to the version of Admati and Pfleiderer
(1991) [AP] "sunshine trading" model in which there is no private information, but liquidity
providers must incur a cost to trade in a risky asset. In that setting, order preannouncement
tends to reduce expected trading costs of investors (called 'liquidity traders' by AP) and
increase ex-ante expected utility of market makers. In both models, increased transparency
makes market makers more willing to supply liquidity to the market, although the mecha-
nisms behind this effect are quite different. Other related papers, Madhavan (1992, 1995),
Pagano and R6ell (1996), and Biais (1993), examine the impact of market design on the
price formation process. In the first three papers, asymmetric information plays a key role
in determining how differences in trading mechanisms affect properties of prices. The last
paper analyzes the differences between centralized and fragmented markets caused by the
varying availability of information about inventory positions of liquidity providers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I describe the model in Section 3.2. The
analysis of the model is presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
There are three time periods, t = 0, 1, 2, and two types of agents, investors and market mak-
ers. Investors are competitive, risk-averse, and receive a risky endowment. The endowment
risk consists of two components. First, there is a fundamental uncertainty about payoff of a
unit of endowment. Second, there is uncertainty about the number of units of endowment
that an investor would receive. This is the liquidity risk in the model. Uncertainty about
their endowments gives investors a hedging motive to trade with competitive, risk-neutral
market makers, who are subject to a financial constraint. When this constraint is binding,
the price of the risky asset and agents' demands will reflect the liquidity risk. In this context,
a more transparent equilibrium occurs when there is less uncertainty about liquidity risk. I
next describe in detail the assets, the agent types, and the nature of the liquidity risk.
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3.2.1 Assets
There are two assets available for trading. The riskless asset has an exogenous gross return
equal to 1. The risky asset is in zero net supply, and pays off only at time 2. Its payoff is equal
to d1 ±d2, where (di, d2) are i.i.d. random variables realized at time 1 and 2, respectively. I
assume that dt has an exponential distribution with parameter 0, so that E[dt] = 1/Q. We
will see shortly that dt captures the fundamental risk in the economy at time t. Therefore,
the most natural interpretation of the risky asset is that it is a derivative security on the
uncertain endowment stream.
3.2.2 Investors
There are Ni exponential utility investors with coefficient of absolute risk aversion y. An
investor's endowment at time 2 is given by uOd 1 + uid2 , where aO is a fixed parameter known
by all agents, and ai is a random variable that represents the liquidity risk in the model.
An investor chooses her holdings of the risky asset, yo and Yi, to maximize expected utility
of final wealth. Her optimization problem, Pi, is thus
max Eo [-e W2,
{yo, Y1i
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
where pt is time t price of the risky asset and yt(Pt+1 - Pt) is a capital gain from holding the




There are Nm market makers who are risk-neutral, endowed with initial wealth wo = Wm,
and choose their holdings of the risky asset, xO and x1 , to maximize the expected final wealth
w 2 . In addition to the intertemporal budget constraint, a market maker is also subject to a
financial constraint that can take one of two forms. He either cannot borrow (wt - Xtpt
0, t = 0, 1), or he has to maintain non-negative wealth at all times (wtt 0, t = 0, 1, 2).
I refer to the first constraint as 'Borrowing constraint', and to the second one as 'Wealth
constraint'. The market maker's optimization problem, Pm, is
max EoIw 2 J
{xo, r1}
subject to the dynamic budget constraint
wt+i= wt + xt(Pt+1 --Pt)), t =0,1
and either the Borrowing constraint
w -xtpt > 0), tz=0,1
or the Wealth constraint
wtj> 0, t = 0,1,2.
3.2.4 Liquidity Risk and the Notion of Transparency
The liquidity risk in the model is represented by the uncertainty about u 1. It is assumed to be
a binomial random variable that takes values (u{), uf) with equal probabilities. Results for
other distributions of ui, approximating continuous uniform and exponential distributions,
are qualitatively similar to those presented in Section 3.3.
To analyze the effect of market transparency on agents' welfare, I compute two distinct
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equilibria. In the transparent equilibrium, the realization of u1 is revealed to all agents before
trading at time 0. In the non-transparent equilibrium, the realization of i 1 is revealed at
time 1. Hereafter, I will refer to the transparent and non-transparent equilibria as revealing
and non-revealing, respectively.
3.2.5 Definition of an Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists of prices (po, p1), and asset holdings (xo, x1 ) of market
makers and (yo, y1) of investors, such that
(a) given the prices, (xo, xi) solve the problem 2 m and (yo, y1) solve the problem Pi ,
(b) risky asset market clears: Ni yt + Nm Xt 0 , t = 0,1.
3.3 Analysis
In this section, we derive an equilibrium defined in Section 3.2.5 for both Wealth-constraint
and Borrowing-constraint cases. We numerically compute revealing and non-revealing equi-
librium for both constraints and compare the welfare of the agents in the two equilibria.
This is the subject of Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. Social optimality of market makers' positions
is considered in Section 3.3.3. Finally, in Section 3.3.4 I look at how volatility of the liquidity
shock (a 1 ) affects the comparison between revealing and non-revealing equilibrium.
3.3.1 Wealth-Constraint Case
We solve for equilibrium using dynamic programming. I only give expressions for prices and
investor's asset holdings (yo, y1), since demands of market makers are easily computed from
these using market clearance condition.
At time 1, investor chooses yi to solve P. Since P2 = d + d2 , her optimization problem
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becomes
max E1 [-e- Y(w1+Y1(di -pi)+(ui +yM)d 2 )] .(3.1)
Y1
Computing expectation with respect to d2 and setting the FOC to 0 gives the following
expression for yi:
1
Y1 = -U1i+ p. (3.2)
-y(p1 - di)
If the market maker at time 1 is unconstrained,
pi = El [d, + d2] = di + 1/13, (3.3a)
Y1 = -Ui . (3.3b)
Not surprisingly, risk-neutral market maker bears all endowment risk in this case. The
restriction that has to be satisfied for the market maker to be unconstrained is
wi +x 1 ( min P2] -PI) = W +xi(di -pi) 0 . (3.4)
d2
We now use the market maker's budget constraint to substitute for w 1 , market clearance
condition to substitute for xO and xi, and equation (3.3) to substitute for pi and yi. Defining
Wm=- -jy vm, the wealth constraint becomes
Wm - yo(di + 1/Q8- po) - 1/3u 1 >0 . (3.5)
The first two terms of this inequality represent market maker's initial wealth and his capital
gain between time 0 and time 1 (per investor). The sum of these two terms is equal to market
maker's per-investor wealth at time 1. The last term represents the maximum capital loss
that a market maker can suffer between time 1 and 2 when he fully absorbs investor's time
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2 endowment risk. For a given yo and po, whether or not market maker is constrained at
time 1 depends on the realization of d, and a 1. Since market maker is long the asset, for
large enough d, the inequality would always be satisfied. On the other hand, if $Lm is large
enough, the restriction would be satisfied even when d = 0. It would be useful to define j
as the minimum value of d, for which the market maker at time 1 becomes unconstrained:
d _=max[0,Po-+ (3.6)
When the market maker is constrained, condition (3.4) holds with equality. Substituting
for w1 , o, and x 1 and rearranging gives
Wm+ yo(Pi - Po)
y1 P (3.7)Y1 -- WMpi - di(37
Combining equations (3.2) and (3.7), we obtain pi as a function of d1, u 1 , po, and yo:
P= 3+dyu i +1  ±=Y(Wm+YOM) Ac= Ad + B . (3.8)3 + 7u+uvyyo I+yui+m-yo
Thus, the functional form of solution for pi depends on the realized value of d1 :
{Ad + B d1 < (3.9)
di + 1//3, di > d
It is easy to verify that the two expressions are equal at d, making price at time 1 a continuous
piecewise linear function. Notice that non-positive yo implies that A > 1. In the constrained
region, price at time 1 increases faster than one-for-one with di because larger dividend has
an indirect effect of relaxing the market maker's constraint.
Using agents' equilibrium demands to compute their value functions, we obtain
1
Vm(wim) E1[W 2 m Wim] =Wm: -0 I)'(3.10a)
Vi(wig) E1[-e-2i I Wis] = -- 3 (pi - d 1 )e-Ywis+-(+/u1)(p-d1) . (3.10b)
From (3.10), market maker's marginal utility of wealth at time 1, V'4(wim), is equal to
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1/0 (p1 - di). When constraint is not binding, the value of this expression is always equal
to 1. In the constrained equilibrium, market maker's marginal utility is no longer constant;
it is always above 1, and is decreasing in d, and increasing in u. Thus, the market maker's
indirect utility of wealth at time 1 is concave. The possibility of being constrained at time
1 induces the market maker to behave in a risk-averse manner at time 0.
Using the value functions defined in (3.10), we derive agents' optimality conditions at
time 0. Investor's optimality condition becomes
Eo [(pi - di)(pi -po)e-Y(uod1+yop1)-( 3 +YU1)(p1-d1)] = EO [(P1 --PO) V'(wi)] = 0 . (3.11)
In the revealing equilibrium, zi is known, and the expectation is computed with respect to
d, only. In the non-revealing equilibrium, expectation is computed with respect to both a 1
and d1.
To obtain the optimality condition of a market maker, first observe that
L1
P= min Pi = +max(u) (3.12)
{n 1, di}
The optimality condition then becomes
Eoi = Eo [(p - Po) VA(wim)] = 0 and tvrm + xo(pf - po) > 0, (3.13)
1p, - dij
or
EO I" = Eo [(pi - Po) Vk(Wim)] > 0 and 2m ± xo(pf -- Po) =0. (3.14)
pI - di
In the unconstrained case, equations (3.11) and (3.13) are solved simultaneously to obtain
yo and po. The expectation in equation (3.13) has to be calculated numerically. When the
market maker is constrained, equation (3.14) and market clearance condition can be used to
substitute po out of equation (3.11). The resulting algebraic equation is solved numerically
to obtain yo and then po. In the revealing equilibrium, (yo, po) would be a function of a 1 ,
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while in the non-revealing equilibrium the solution is independent of u 1.
The discussion so far in this section can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the Wealth-constraint case, there exists a competitive equilibrium. The
equilibrium at time 0 may be constrained or unconstrained. The solution of the unconstrained
equilibrium is given by equations (3.11) and (3.13); the constrained equilibrium solution is
given by equations (3.11) and (3.14).4
Once we have obtained equilibrium solution at time 0, we can compute agents' ex-ante
welfare by taking expectations of their value functions given by equation (3.10):
F 11~
E(W2 m) = Eo [(mm ± + (p1 Po)) ,d)J (3.15a)
0(pi - d)
EU(w2 ) = Eo [--3(p, - di)e-Y (uodl+Yo(P1-O))+1-(+Yu1)(P1-dl) , (3.15b)
where p, is given by equation (3.9).
To analyze the welfare implications of transparency, I compute the revealing and non-
revealing equilibrium for a range of values of Nm, keeping all other parameters fixed. Raising
Nm increases Wm, the initial wealth of a market maker per investor. Thus, we increase
the total amount of liquidity available in the market without changing the endowments of
individual agents. In Figure 3-1, I plot equilibrium prices and agents' demands at time 0, as
well as differences in agents' welfare between the two equilibria.
In the Wealth-constraint case, the more transparent equilibrium always makes an investor
better off and makes a market maker better off most of the time. Thus, for low values of
Nm, the revealing equilibrium is Pareto optimal. This happens because better information
about the liquidity state results in more efficient sharing of fundamental risk, and this effect
more than compensates for inability to share the liquidity risk.
As the amount of liquidity in the market goes up, price at time 0 increases steadily
towards the expected payoff of the asset equal to 2/3, and an investor sells a larger fraction
of her risky endowment to the market maker. For sufficiently large Nm, equilibrium becomes
unconstrained in both periods, and market makers bear all endowment risk.
4While I have not proved formally that the equilibrium is unique, numeric experiments strongly imply
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Figure 3-1: Comparison of revealing and non-revealing equilibrium in the Wealth-constraint case.























It is worth noting that the amount sold by an individual investor at time 0 in the 'High'
state of the revealing equilibrium may actually exceed her initial endowment aO = 2 (see
panel (b) of the Figure). An investor knows that her demand for liquidity in that state at
time 1 will be large. When price in the initial period is sufficiently high, she therefore shorts
d, as a hedge, since any realization of d, would have an opposite effect on her gain from this
trade and on market makers' ability to provide liquidity at time 1.
It is also notable that the amount traded in the non-revealing equilibrium is smaller
than in both states of the revealing equilibrium (see panels (b) and (d) of the Figure). It is
not surprising that it is smaller than the volume in the 'High' state. But why is it smaller
than the volume in the 'Low' state? Remember that in the non-revealing equilibrium, agents
trade to hedge the liquidity risk as well as the fundamental risk. For a given realization of d1 ,
demand for liquidity will be bigger in the 'High' state, and prices will be lower. An investor
would sell more of the asset at these low prices, but she is compensated by having a larger
endowment. A market maker, who is long the asset at time 0, would have lower wealth, but
more attractive investment opportunities would be available to him. The opposite occurs in
the 'Low' state. Thus, for both agents, hedging demand associated with liquidity risk offsets
their hedging demand associated with fundamental risk. The possibility of being constrained
when investment opportunities are good increases market makers' effective risk aversion.
Higher transaction volume explains why market makers are much better off in the re-
vealing equilibrium when there are few of them. As we add more market makers, prices in
the revealing equilibrium increase faster than in the non-revealing one. Eventually, market
makers become better off in the non-revealing equilibrium, although not by much. At the
same time, investors benefit from the rising prices that make revealing equilibrium even more
preferable for them. As we keep adding liquidity, both equilibria become unconstrained and
converge to each other.
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3.3.2 Borrowing-Constraint Case
Again, we start at time 1 and work backwards. The investor's optimality condition at time
1 remains the same:
1 #3
Y1 = -U 1 + .d(3.16)
-y(p1 - di) -y
If the market maker at time 1 is unconstrained,
pi = E1 [d, + d2] = di + 1/13, (3.17a)
Y1 = -Ui. (3.17b)
The restriction that has to be satisfied for the market maker to be unconstrained is
W1 - xip1 > 0 . (3.18)
Again, we use the market maker's budget constraint to substitute for w1 , market clearance
condition to substitute for io and xi, and equation (3.17) to substitute for pi and yi. The
borrowing constraint becomes
Wm - Yo (di+ 1/0 - po) - (di+ 1/)Ui > 0 . (3.19)
The first two terms of the inequality represent market maker's time 1 wealth (per investor),
while the last term represents the amount of capital required to fully absorb investor's
endowment risk. If <1  -yo, there is no additional supply at time 1, and the constraint
does not bind. If i 1 > -yo, then the constraint will bind for a large enough value of d1 .
Again, it will be useful to define d as the minimum value of the dividend for which the
market maker becomes constrained:
-- 1max 01,W(3.20)
1 YO + U1 #
113
In the Wealth-constraint case, the constraint is binding when d < d, and is lax otherwise.
The opposite is true in the Borrowing-constraint case. When a1 > -yo, the amount of capital
needed to absorb supply at time 1 increases faster in di than does the market maker's wealth,
and the constraint eventually becomes binding.
When the market maker is constrained, condition (3.18) holds with equality. Substituting
for w1 , o, and x 1 gives
Yi_ -Wm + Yo(P1 -PO) .(3.21)
Combining equations (3.16) and (3.21), we obtain the following quadratic equation for p:
ap4-- bp 1 + c =O, where (3.22a)
a =#3+ -m1+yyo , c = y(im +y pO) di, b = adi+ c/di + 1 . (3.22b)
Although this equation has two roots, only one of them satisfies the no-arbitrage bounds.
Thus, the solution for pi is given by
Pd 1 13d(3.23)
b+v'b 2 -4ac dd
2a ' 1-
Direct calculation shows that pi is continuous at d.
The agents' value functions are given by
Vm(wim) = Ei[W2 m Iwim] = Wim d + 1/ (3.24a)
V(w 1 ) E1[-e-7W" Iws] = -l(m1 - di)c-ywi+1-(+7u-)(pld) . (3.24b)
It is worth noting that market maker's marginal utility of wealth is non-monotone in d1.
When d < d, ,the equilibrium is unconstrained, and marginal utility is equal to 1. For
d, > d, marginal utility exceeds 1. However, as d becomes large, the no-arbitrage restriction
pi > d, implies that marginal utility approaches unity once again.
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The optimality condition of an investor at time 0 still has the same form,
Eo [(pi - po) V'(w 1 1)] = 0. (3.25)
Of course, the functional form of V( is now different, and it is no longer possible to compute
this expectation in closed form over the constrained region (i.e. when di > J).
The optimality condition of the market maker becomes




F(p1 -po)(di + 1/fl)1E0  i PiJ Eo[(pi - po) V(wm)] > 0 and WM - xopoO=0.
(3.27)
In the unconstrained case, equations (3.25) and (3.26) are solved simultaneously to obtain
yo and po. The expectation in equation (3.26) has to be calculated numerically. When the
market maker is constrained, equation (3.27) and market clearance condition can be used to
substitute po out of equation (3.25). The resulting equation is solved numerically to obtain
yo and then po. Again, in the revealing equilibrium yo and po are functions of ai, while in
the non-revealing equilibrium the solution is independent of a 1.
The discussion in this section is summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the Borrowing-constraint case, there exists a competitive equilibrium. The
equilibrium at time 0 may be constrained or unconstrained. The solution of the unconstrained
equilibrium is given by equations (3.25) and (3.26); the constrained equilibrium solution is
given by equations (3.25) and (3.27).'
Once we have obtained equilibrium prices and demands at time 0 for the revealing and
'As in the Wealth-constraint case, numerical results suggest that there is a unique equilibrium.
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non-revealing equilibria, we can compute agents' ex-ante welfare as follows:
E(w2 m) = Eo [(m + xo(pi - PO))d, i/ (3.28a)Pi_
EU(w2 i) = EO I-3(p- - di)e Y(uod+yo(p1-po))+1-(+±1T)(pi-di) (3.28b)
where pi is given by equation (3.23).
To analyze the welfare implications of transparency, I again compute the revealing and
non-revealing equilibrium for a range of values of Nm, keeping all other parameters fixed.
The results for the Borrowing-constraint case are shown in Figure 3-2.
Except for very small values of Nm, the welfare implications of market transparency in
the Borrowing-constraint case are similar to those in the Wealth-constraint case. Investors
are always better off in the transparent equilibrium, and market makers are better off most
of the time. For the smallest values of Nm, lack of liquidity makes investors worse off in the
transparent equilibrium, although not by much. When market makers are very constrained,
the gain from better risk sharing of the fundamental risk in the revealing equilibrium does
not offset the loss resulting from the inability to share liquidity risk (the Hirshleifer effect).
Interestingly, the graph of the amount sold by an investor in the 'High' state of the
revealing equilibrium looks a lot different compared to the Wealth-constraint case. This
difference is caused by the fact that, in the Borrowing-constraint case, higher d implies that
market makers are more constrained and, therefore, are less able to provide liquidity for the
investors. Consequently, unlike in the Wealth-constraint case, an investor is always net long
d1 , again for hedging reasons.
Because the Borrowing constraint is more restrictive than the Wealth constraint, a larger
number of market makers is required to make equilibrium unconstrained in both periods;
Nm ranges from 1 to 13 in the graphs for the Wealth-constraint case, and from 1 to 30 in the
graphs for the Borrowing-constraint case. Moreover, the relative magnitudes of aO and u{'
imply that there is always a positive probability that a market maker would be constrained
at time 1 (see discussion following equation (3.19)). As Nm becomes large, this probability
tends to zero, and the equilibrium solution asymptotes to the unconstrained one.
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Figure 3-2: Comparison of revealing and non-revealing equilibrium in the Borrowing-constraint






























and the relationship between the volatility of liquidity shock (a 1 ) and the benefits of trans-
parency. Because the results for the two forms of market makers' constraint are qualitatively
similar, I will only present results for the Wealth-constraint case.
3.3.3 Social Optimality of Market Makers' Positions
In this section I examine whether the amount of liquidity provided by the market makers
is (locally) socially optimal. To do this, I take the individual market maker's position (xo)
computed as described in Section 3.3.1 and perturb it up and down by one percent. The
new equilibrium price is then computed by minimizing investor's optimality condition (3.11),
subject to the market maker's wealth constraint. I then recompute agents' expected utilities
and compare them with the ones from the unperturbed equilibrium. The agents' utility
differences for the four comparisons (revealing and non-revealing equilibrium, exogenous
increase and decrease) are presented in Figure 3-3.
It is easier to analyze the two bottom graphs, which show welfare implications of a small
exogenous decrease in market makers' positions. When the quantity bought by market
makers is reduced, prices have to drop in order to satisfy investors' FOC. Thus, the effect
on investors is unambiguously negative: they get to sell less of their risky endowment, and
at lower prices. For market makers, the price and quantity effects work in the opposite
directions: they get to buy less of an asset, but at lower prices. Except for very low values of
Nm in the revealing equilibrium (see panel (c) of the Figure), the price effect dominates, and
market makers are better off. The exact shape of the graph is determined by whether the
market makers' constraint is binding, and also by the fact that as Nm grows, the decrease
in demand of an individual market maker has a larger impact on an individual investor.
The effect of exogenous increase in market makers' positions is more complicated. When
their constraint is binding, prices have to drop so that the constraint is still satisfied. This
makes market makers better off, and investors worse off. When the constraint is not binding,
the effect is reversed. In addition, for a range of values of Nm in the revealing equilibrium,
the constraint is binding in the 'Low' state, but is lax in the 'High' state. When this is the
case, the exogenous increase in market makers' position has the opposite impact on their
welfare in the two states - positive in the 'low' state, and negative in the 'high' state. That
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Figure 3-3: Welfare effects of exogenous change in market maker's position in the Wealth-constraint
case. 'Increase' refers to one percent increase in market maker's optimal position; 'Decrease' refers
to one percent decrease in market maker's optimal position. The graphs show the difference between
agents' utility in the perturbed and unperturbed equilibrium. Parameter values: y = 1, f = 1, nO =









is why the graph as a function of Nm is non-monotone for this scenario.
To summarize, the results for both revealing and non-revealing equilibria indicate that no
Pareto improvement can be obtained by making small exogenous changes in market makers'
positions. The welfare implications for the Borrowing-constraint are very similar to those
presented above.
3.3.4 Volatility of Liquidity Shock
The analysis in Section 3.3.1 indicates that market makers are averse to liquidity risk, espe-
cially when the total amount of liquidity in the market is low. This risk aversion manifests
itself in the relatively low trading volume observed in the non-revealing equilibrium. There-
fore, one might conjecture that the effect of market transparency would be more pronounced
when the volatility of liquidity shock is high. However, there is a potentially offsetting effect
caused by inability to share liquidity risk in the transparent equilibrium, since ui is revealed
to all agents before trading at time 0 occurs.
Since the numeric solution of the equilibrium does not allow to disentangle these two
effects, I graphically compare solutions for two volatility levels of the liquidity shock. For
the high-volatility case, a1 can take the values (0.2, 4.8) with equal probability, while the
corresponding values for the low-volatility case are the ones used in Section 3.3.1, (1.0, 4.0).
The mean of a1 is of course the same in the two cases. Figure 3-4 shows the results of this
comparison.
The graphs clearly show that the difference between revealing and non-revealing equilib-
rium is much more dramatic when the volatility of liquidity shock is high. The difference
in trading volume between revealing and non-revealing equilibrium is a lot bigger in the
high-volatility case. This happens because market makers are less willing to provide liq-
uidity in the non-revealing equilibrium when volatility of the liquidity shock is high. The
transparency benefit accruing to investors in a revealing equilibrium is also much greater
in the high-volatility case. Apparently, the gain from better sharing of the fundamental
risk dominates the loss caused by the inability to share liquidity risk. The same holds true
when market makers are subject to the Borrowing constraint. In the high-volatility case,
revealing equilibrium is better for investors even for the smallest values of Nm, unlike in the
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Figure 3-4: The relationship between volatility of liquidity shock and market transparency
(Wealth-constraint case). Under 'High Volatility', u{ = 4.8,UL = 0.2. Under 'Low Volatility',
UH 4.0, uL = 1.0. The graphs show the difference between revealing and non-revealing equi-
librium under the two volatility regimes. Other parameter values: -y = 1,3 = 1, no = 2, 'm =
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low-volatility case presented in Section 3.3.2.
3.4 Conclusion
I consider a three-period model in which financially constrained risk-neutral market makers
supply liquidity to risk-averse investors. There are two sources of uncertainty in the model:
the endowment risk, and the liquidity risk. In the revealing equilibrium, the latter uncer-
tainty is resolved before trading begins, while in the non-revealing equilibrium, it is not. I
compare agents' welfare under the two equilibria, and examine whether their positions are
socially optimal.
The possibility that market makers' constraint would be binding in the intermediate pe-
riod induces them to behave in a risk-averse manner in the initial period.6 Eliminating the
uncertainty about investors' liquidity shock decreases market makers' effective risk aversion,
and improves the sharing of endowment risk. For most parameter values, this effect domi-
nates the welfare loss associated with the inability to share the liquidity risk, and both agents
are better off in the revealing equilibrium. Not surprisingly, higher volatility of investors'
liquidity shock increases the difference between the revealing and non-revealing equilibria.
I also find that small exogenous changes in market makers' equilibrium positions are not
Pareto improving.
6Grossman and Vila (1992) make a similar observation.
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